This month, Lt. Gen. Harry Raduege Jr. examines transition plans-his favorite, in particular, which is the 500-day plan. He discusses his experience using such a plan at CENTCOM and at DISA, and the benefits of doing so over, say, an 18-month plan or the "typical" five-year strategic plan favored by so many organizations. That leaves us with this month's Incoming question: What transition models are working for your agency or organization? How might the 500-day plan work for you?
Various mechanisms exist to achieve success, but the power and benefit of 500-day plans have been proven repeatedly. Organizations can use this approach to plan and quantitatively measure the success of transformational activities even during the most dynamic of times.
In this month's Incoming column, Lt. Gen. Harry Raduege Jr. notes how everyone is going mobile and virtual. He traces how DISA approached the challenges of telework beginning in 2000 in an effort to improve productivity, ease the time and money burden of travel, reduce traffic congestion and boost morale. He notes:
It seems today that everyone is going mobile and virtual in conducting business. Military forces on the move are being given better access to critical information needed to conduct military operations, and business leaders are almost constantly connected to others in their fast-moving, daily business lives. Not long ago, we thought that being able to plug into a data stream at a wall socket was pretty agile and “high-speed.” However, we’re quickly moving into an era where wireless connectivity and virtual presence are provided almost everywhere we travel. Most people I pass on the street today are connected to someone on the other end of a powerful handheld communication device.
In 1995, Lt. Gen. Albert J. Edmonds, USAF, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) director, called me asking for help. At that time I was the director of command and control systems (J-6) for the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Gen. Edmonds had provided briefings on the attributes of the new Global Command and Control System (GCCS) but needed to have it installed and operational in a “real warfighting command” such as USCENTCOM.
Tech-savvy younger workers from Generation Y are accustomed to easy, speedy access to information. In the not-too-distant future, late Boomers and even Generation X workers will have to adapt to the ways that work force culture is changing as a result of this incoming generation's influence. This month's Incoming column examines howrganizations are faced with the challenge to remain relevant, but must do so in a way that makes change a positive asset.
In the column, Lt. Gen. Harry D. Raduege Jr., USAF (Ret.), writes:
Culture is the set of shared attitudes, values, goals and practices that characterizes an organization. Today, I hear leaders complaining that their biggest organizational problems boil down to issues involving that one word. If culture is indeed the problem, it should be addressed and not continually ignored or tolerated.
Cybersecurity is becoming a critical issue for both government and industry—and for good reason. A dangerous combination of cyber-related activity is growing daily around us. This includes dependence on technology, skyrocketing cyber crime and terrorism, and vulnerabilities hidden by the complexities of an interconnected, global network. In government, industry and our personal lives, we have growing cyber dependence because that is how we are able to better perform missions, conduct business operations and lead our daily lives.
This is what I’ve been hearing from government and industry leaders who invested heavily in information technology to improve organizational performance but didn’t see the returns they expected. Some chief executive officers implemented instant messaging software across their organizations to improve communication flow, but because users were not convinced that communications were secure, instant messaging was ignored. In other situations, both leadership and staff were uncomfortable with social networking tools because they were used to communicating through other people—not with more direct, less formal means.
Between 1870 and 1871, the European continent experienced the Franco-Prussian War, which gave no warning of what World War I would be like. But this “quaint” war did foreshadow the importance of logistics, the need for reliable lines of communication and the effect of rapid innovation on the battlefield.
Not long ago, network-centric warfare (NCW) theologians stated that the information advantage generated by information technology could provide a new competitive warfighting advantage on tomorrow’s battlefield. For the first time in the history of warfare, geographically dispersed forces would be completely networked and thus much more effective. Other terms soon followed to operationalize the theory, such as information/knowledge superiority and information dominance. These terms were operationally refreshing, philosophically mesmerizing and intellectually seductive.
The U.S. Defense Department is investing billions of dollars in new military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) systems such as the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Wideband Global Services (WGS) and Transformational Communications System (TCS) to transform the way U.S. forces communicate and operate in modern combat. Unfortunately, reliance on these expensive and delayed programs has hampered the networked capabilities of operating units. Specific programs
Recently, President George W. Bush and the U.S. Defense Department announced the creation of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to “help Africans achieve their own security, not to extend the scope of the war on terrorism or secure African resources.” Had this statement been made five years ago, most of the world would have openly supported the notion of a U.S.-led effort to ease human suffering. But today the
A remarkable young Marine officer named Maj. Douglas A. Zembiec was killed in action on May 11, 2007, during his fourth tour in Iraq. What makes his story so compelling is not the fact that he was referred to as the "Lion of Fallujah" as a result of heroic actions during operation Vigilant Resolve in 2004 or as an "unapologetic warrior" featured in a Los Angeles Times interview three years ago. He was remarkable because his life and untimely death are emblematic of the men and women who serve our nation selflessly, without hesitation, quietly volunteering as Maj. Zembiec had done. How can each of us, from the comfort and security of home, meaningfully contribute to the common good of our nation?
It is not often that government leadership discusses the importance of system engineering or complex system management, but major setbacks for the U.S. Coast Guard's $24 billion Deepwater program are casting a shadow over the use of lead system integrators on other U.S. Defense Department acquisitions. These setbacks also are highlighting the lack of government system engineering knowledge.
A few years ago, the U.S. Defense Department stated that transformation is "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition … through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations." It was a good enough start, but if this description is to hold, then what defines the shape of both current and future transformational success? A process without successful execution or quantitative feedback is of little value. Transformation requires more than change for change's sake.
Last month I toured an industrial site once famous for its manufacturing proficiency. In its heyday, this steel and shipbuilding facility dominated the industrial world. Sparrows Point, in Baltimore's harbor, was a symbol of U.S. manufacturing might. But, it also has a special personal connection. This former world-class facility of Bethlehem Steel—my hometown's namesake—was responsible for building the USS Saratoga, which was the post-World-War-II aircraft carrier on which I embarked for a nine-month nugget cruise as an Intruder pilot during operation Desert Storm.
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are shouldering the nation's burden in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they are suffering the majority of their casualties from roadside bombs. To dramatically reduce injuries and loss of life caused by fragmentation and blast overpressure, the two services are rapidly fielding 4,000 to 6,000 mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles. There is no question that the immediate fielding of these mine-resistant vehicles will help protect our nation's most valuable military assets—service members. But is this the complete answer to a problem?
In a Naval Institute Press publication, Inside the Iron Works: How Grumman's Glory Days Faded, George Skurla, the former chief executive officer of Grumman Aerospace, and William H. Gregory describe the failures and downfall, 30 years ago, of one of our leading naval aviation manufacturers. After reading this obituary it is easy to draw parallels to the specter that has befallen many current defense companies and acquisition guardians. We all recognize that there are many other factors responsible—congressional political influence, policy dictums, service secretaries and chiefs of service. But doesn't anyone realize that the U.S. Defense Department is suffocating under unaffordable cost overruns, catastrophic failures in engineering design, poor manufacturing quality and incompetent technical government oversight?
In his book Capitalism and Freedom, Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman states that government by its nature contributes "enormous inertia—a tyranny of the status quo—in governmental arrangements. Only a crisis, actual or perceived, produces real change." As a result of the crises caused by Hurricane Katrina and the tsunami that ravaged Indonesia, Congress pressured the U.S. Defense Department to deliver government-based information-sharing services to assist citizens struck by natural or manmade disasters. The need to access, share and disseminate information to save lives by rapidly coordinating humanitarian relief is paramount.