



INTELLIGENCE: The Way Forward

A White Paper prepared by the
AFCEA Intelligence Committee
December 2005



The Association Committed to Serving the Intelligence Professional

**Strengthening our Nation’s Intelligence Community –
“Action This Day”**

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Executive Summary

The Intelligence Committee of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) (the Committee) is pleased to present this fourth in a series of white papers focused on the future of the Intelligence Community (IC) (the Community). This paper provides recommendations the Committee believes can be taken by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Community this fiscal year, in some cases to achieve strengthened capabilities in support of an integrated IC, in other cases to lay the foundation for longer term steps to achieve these capabilities. We offer this paper in advance of the Fall Intelligence Symposium sponsored by AFCEA and the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), formerly the Security Affairs Support Association (SASA), in hopes of helping frame the discussion that will take place during the symposium.

The Committee has examined the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA 2004), the report of the 9/11 Commission, and the report of the President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the WMD Commission). We have sought themes common to these documents. Our recommendations are intended to support the overall thrust of the act and of the commissions. They fall within several specific categories:

Rebuilding the IC—We recommend:

- 1 Specific steps both to enhance the partnership between government, industry, academia, and others and to build a Community that regards these components as intrinsic to the Community.
- 2 A commitment to the development of a common service oriented architecture and information infrastructure serving the entire integrated IC.
- 3 A commitment to address science and technology deficits and challenges facing the nation and therefore the IC itself. Within the context of this commitment, we recommend the IC accept responsibility for a portion of the national science and technology challenge and that the Community work with other parties to build a strengthened national strategy to meet that challenge.
- 4 A commitment to investment in human capital supporting low density/high demand skill areas.

The Intelligence Workforce—We recommend:

- 1 A program to build an integrated intelligence executive cadre.
- 2 A program to build an integrated intelligence analyst cadre.
- 3 Standards, incentives, development programs, and curricula in support of both cadres.
- 4 Initiatives to strengthen linguist capabilities and cultural intelligence awareness.
- 5 Strengthened support for intelligence programs in diversity and equal opportunity.

Operational Concepts—We recommend:

- 1 Creation of a joint, or virtual, intelligence task force approach for unified mission management.
- 2 Development of joint intelligence operations concepts.
- 3 Development and deployment of integrated intelligence mission management capabilities in support of these concepts.

Tradecraft—We recommend:

- 1 Initiatives to strengthen tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities.
- 2 Development of capabilities to make intelligence more agile, adaptable, and flexible to meet emergency and other urgent mission demands.

The Committee recognizes that these recommendations do not encompass the full spectrum of possible and even needed enhancements to our intelligence capabilities. We urge the Community as a whole, including its government, industry, academic, and other constituents, to continue the search for other needed enhancements and for bold solutions to make possible those enhancements. We view the recommendations presented in this paper as “low hanging fruit,” actions that can be taken now and that should provide substantial results in the near term.

We urge “action this day.”

Introduction

The Committee is pleased to present this fourth in a series of white papers focused on the future of the IC. The Committee's development of these papers and the intelligence symposia they accompany are intended to contribute substantively to the national discussion underway about strengthening our nation's intelligence capabilities. The Committee is aware of changes taking place in the user community, in the development of intelligence priorities, among the leadership of the Community, and in the underlying operational concepts by which intelligence is made organic to the pursuit of our national interests. These white papers and symposia are intended to support those changes in a manner as dynamic as the changes themselves.

This white paper contrasts in some important ways with the three preceding white papers.¹ First, the Committee is circulating this paper to speakers, panelists, and other participants in advance of the next symposium. We are doing so to help frame the symposium discussion, focusing that discussion on key subjects of specific, immediate importance to the future of the IC.

Second, this paper accompanies the first symposium co-sponsored by the AFCEA and INSA. As a result, the paper and symposium should address a wider audience than previous papers reached. The audience will comprise decision-makers and persons of influence throughout the government component of the IC and the industrial and academic base that supports it.

Third, this paper builds on previous recommendations, including those contained in the earlier papers, the report of the 9/11 Commission, and the report of the WMD Commission, as well as on the mandates contained within the IRTPA 2004 and various Executive Orders governing the restructuring of the IC. This paper provides recommendations, based on that source material, for implementation in the near term that the Committee believes can provide immediate benefit to the Community and the nation.

Finally, this paper's recommendations extend beyond the government component of the IC to its industrial base, to academia, and to others that provide capabilities and intellectual capital to our nation's intelligence establishment. In doing so, it reflects recent discussions related to the creation of a national security alliance that brings government and industry closer together, while encompassing the broader membership represented by AFCEA and INSA. Members of the Committee have long held that the nation's industrial capacity is an element intrinsic to the IC—that the IC is no stronger than the nation's industrial base. We look to precedents set during the Second World War when government and industry pioneered new means of industrial organization, systems analysis, and operations research to create new and decisive operational concepts and technologies. From this early partnership emerged technical intelligence and the many technological achievements that marked our successes following World War II. As a result, we call the attention of industry, academia, and other institutions to this paper's

¹ See: <http://www.afcea.org/committees/intel/intelwhitepaper.asp>

recommendations. We look to the creation of an intelligence capability designed to meet the nation's total intelligence needs.

The Committee is aware that many of its recommendations echo those of others. To the extent they do, we see ourselves as putting "our shoulder to a common wheel," lending weight to the important national effort of creating the best IC possible.

We know too that these recommendations are not definitive. Rather, they represent a work in progress, as does the Community itself. Rather than envisioning an idealized end state, we seek to contribute to a continuous national investment in an ever-improving, vital national capability.

This paper's recommendations are short and to the point. Each recommendation is keyed to concerns already raised by the various preceding studies and commissions and is focused on building the integrated IC and capabilities for which these studies and commissions call. The impulse for each recommendation can also be seen in the IRTPA 2004. We make these recommendations because "action this day"² on each of them is possible, and the benefits are tangible in the creation of a truly integrated IC.

Rebuilding the IC

The National Partnership: Government, Industry, Academia, and Other Sectors

An effective partnership among the elements of the IC and components within the private and academic sectors reaches back to some of our nation's greatest traditions. It also reaches forward to one of its greatest potential strengths: harnessing the imperatives of national defense with the innovation bred by market-driven competition and the creativity of open academic debate. The Second World War saw the emergence in the United States of modern industrial organization, systems analysis, and operations research as disciplines unifying military and industrial planning assumptions and the allocation of critical resources—on the battlefield and at home. Industry looked to government for cutting-edge needs as well as for direction in the research and development of important new technology. Government looked to industry for the organizational skills, business models, and productive capacity necessary to give scale to new technologies. Both looked to academia for fresh ideas, independent insight, and an unfettered environment in which new concepts could be brought to light, challenged, and developed.

The Manhattan Project, in which a strong government program manager, an exceptional scientific leader, and committed industrial partners came together, explored basic science, pioneered new technologies, and converted both to an industrial plant of unprecedented scope in about four years. Our nation's nuclear submarine program duplicated much of this feat in the 1950s, pioneering controlled nuclear fission in a compact design, creating new submersible platforms, and integrating both with new navigation, guidance, and weapons delivery systems. As was the case with the Manhattan Project, the nuclear

² "Action this Day" was the direction Winston Churchill gave to his ministers regarding the need to strengthen the resources of Britain's Bletchley Park code breakers. Churchill often added an "action this day" note to memoranda concerning actions he judged urgent.

submarine program was operational in a relatively short span of years. Both efforts represented a strong and effective mix of government, industry, academia, and quasi-public institutions, such as scientific advisory boards during the war and federally funded research and development centers (FFRDC). The creation of a modern intelligence infrastructure in the 1950s and 1960s, allowing our nation to use science and technology in counterpoint to our adversary's more numerous forces, represents another success of this partnership.

Many observers have called for a strong partnership between government, industry, academia, and the quasi-public community. The WMD Commission explored the need for stronger FFRDC resources within the IC.

Creating for the IC a component of the larger national security partnership described earlier requires, above all, recognition that industry is unique from government. Industry is a source of fresh innovation, for example in bio- and information technologies, from which the government can benefit significantly. While today's program managers are often content to rely on industry as a source of adjunct labor, industry's various business models, flexibility, and capacity to operate at scale offer government the ability to implement solutions broadly. Industry's leadership in the development of standard information technologies represents a model recognizable to students of history. Nuclear energy allowed the creation of new standard platforms (nuclear submarines) on which could be placed a flexible and ever-more-modern suite of adaptable technologies. Contemporary information technology allows the IC to create stable, common mission platforms on which can be deployed a wide and ever-changing range of new mission technologies. Working with industry, the government can acquire platforms and systems that scale to today's global intelligence challenge.

Meeting our new challenges and exploiting the opportunities created by a strong partnership will require a renewed national commitment. A need exists within the Community for a strengthened corps of architecture, engineering, and acquisition professionals, led by a strong acquisition and program management component within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) capable of fulfilling the milestone decision authority responsibilities mandated by the IRTPA 2004. To the extent that Community-wide capabilities, consisting of programs and capabilities in several agencies, must be created to support Community-wide requirements, this acquisition and program management component should be equipped to oversee—manage as necessary—program portfolios spanning the Community. FFRDC support can help in developing strong engineering and acquisition strategies within individual agencies and across the Community. Industry must build a stronger cadre of program managers capable of meeting demanding requirements and schedules in a dynamic environment. Academia can deliver new ideas, as industry renews its commitment to academia to build programs that explore scientific questions and generate new technologies pertinent to the Community's challenges. The Community should look as well to including within the partnership university affiliated research centers, or UARCs. UARCs such as the Oak Ridge Associated Universities, have built long-term, strategic relationships with NASA and the departments of Energy and Defense. These relationships have nurtured

fundamental scientific research and the development of applied science to new technologies important to national defense. Some UARCs already have cleared facilities and staffs. With a tradition of proliferating cutting-edge science to both the private sector and the government, UARCs represent a powerful resource that can help the Community gain the benefits of our nation's scientific prowess. Finally, the government should view industry and academia as a network, able to leverage the capabilities that arise from globalization. All parties must recognize industry and academia as members intrinsic to the Community and not just as its partners.

Integrating the Community – Adopting a Single Service Oriented Architecture

The IRTPA 2004 and report of the WMD Commission make clear the necessity for an IC comprised of fully integrated requirements, resources, and capabilities. The Committee echoed this view in its white paper of fall 2004³. In addition, the IRTPA 2004 calls for closer integration between defense, intelligence, and homeland security. The act and the report of the 9/11 Commission make clear the Community's need to look at challenges and threats that defy national borders, including our own.

Important policy work has taken place and is underway to enable operational concepts that allow for a stronger relationship between foreign intelligence information and homeland security. Further, the DOD Joint Transformation Roadmap mandates tighter integration between operations and intelligence. The stage is set to achieve much of the national security integration these policies and mandates describe.

Contemporary technology makes possible closer levels of integration: building the foundation of a common information infrastructure that supports national security integration is an ambitious, but achievable, step. Indeed, implementation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) mandated by the IRTPA 2004 calls for such a step, without which the ISE cannot be a reality. In its first white paper ("National Security and Horizontal Integration"⁴) the Committee pointed to an approach to building that foundation, borrowing lessons from industry's development of large-scale business-to-business (B2B) infrastructures. The Committee urges the Community to undertake a commitment both to strong integration with DOD systems, including the Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) and Global Information Grid (GIG), for all new major information technology-based capabilities and to the creation of a Community-wide service oriented IT architecture (SOA)⁵ encompassing the full range of intelligence requirements and capabilities.

The Committee commends to the Community the view that the time has come to seize boldly the need for a Community-wide architecture that takes full advantage of contemporary technologies for federated query, single sign-on/user rights management,

³ See: <http://www.afcea.org/committees/intel/innse.pdf>

⁴ See: <http://www.afcea.org/committees/intel/HiWhitePaper.pdf>

⁵ "SOA is a strategic framework that allows all interested systems, inside and outside an organization, to access well-defined services, and information bound to those services ..." See: "10 Best Practices for Creating a Service-Oriented Architecture," by David S. Linthicum, Business Integration Journal, October 2006, Volume 7, Number 7, Pg. 24.

and large-scale entity extraction—within a common environment that allows for a wide variety of security classifications, compartments, and access. Current technologies make possible such an environment, built to a common architecture and founded on a common infrastructure. If the need to share, as embodied by the ISE, is to become a Community-wide reality, we cannot delay this vision because of long-held beliefs such as the impossibility of multi-level security. Of no less importance is the need to create a national intelligence architecture and an infrastructure that support the widest possible range of traditional operational needs and also seamlessly support the security of our homeland.

First steps can be taken now. A community-wide SOA taxonomy can be created and made formal almost immediately, certainly within the current fiscal year. SOAs are already being established in multiple elements of the IC and throughout DOD. By adopting common standards and enforcing their use in the Community, the ODNI can develop a timeline that converges these SOAs into an integrated architecture by the end of FY07. Work can take place immediately within the ODNI chief information officer (CIO) organization to build common standards and interfaces with the GIG.

Rebuilding Intelligence Science and Technology

The IRTPA 2004 mandates the establishment within the ODNI of a director for science and technology (S&T). The DNI has already created such a role as an assistant deputy director for science and technology. The WMD Commission's report describes a number of challenges, particularly in the domains of collection and analysis, against which the Community's S&T should be deployed.

As noted in the earlier examples of the Manhattan Project and naval nuclear programs, the Committee believes that the Community must renew its commitment to both basic and applied scientific research—looking at fundamental questions that may be pertinent to our intelligence capabilities and at key issues such as materials science needed to create new systems. The Community must renew its commitment to the development and deployment of new technologies representing the potential for real transformation. In this instance, we use the term “transformation” as meaning a change in operational scale, analogous to the manner in which nuclear energy created weapons and power generation capabilities of scale fundamentally greater than the technologies that preceded its use.

While the IRTPA 2004 provides for the creation of an S&T director, it does not specify the means such a director might use to meet the Community's S&T challenges. The Committee views the current moment as appropriate to consider a model for strong Community-wide governance of science research and technology developmental activities. We recommend the DNI consider establishing a science and technology management board chaired by the S&T director to review, on a consistent basis, S&T priorities and programs throughout the Community and to help each agency define S&T investment initiatives that support the Community's most important challenges. The Committee also recommends building far stronger links between the Community and the national laboratories. Cognizant that some scientific research and technological development will take place over long periods, the Committee commends to the

Community the view that such long-term investments are necessary, given the potential they may hold.

In addition, the Community is challenged by the decline in population of United States S&T professionals relative to the rest of the world. This decline imperils the development of new technologies and control of intellectual capital that is useful to the Community *and* to our understanding of foreign scientific and technology developments. As we have already noted, the Department of Defense undertook partnerships with academia, industry, and the national laboratories in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s to help the nation build the world's foremost S&T establishment, one that gave us leadership in the exploration of scientific questions, creation of civil technologies, unmatched abilities in the exploration and exploitation of space, and superior military technologies.

The National Science Board (NSB)⁶, comprised of 24 scientists, engineers, and educators appointed by the President from across the United States, has studied the state of United States science and technology⁷, and it has noted the relative decline in United States-born science and engineering professionals in comparison with foreign-born students studying in the United States. The task force reported that statistical trends reinforce a national policy imperative—that the government needs to step forward to ensure the adequacy of the future United States science and engineering workforce. Board members said stakeholders must mobilize to initiate efforts to "increase the numbers of U.S. citizens pursuing science and engineering studies and careers." The board recommended as well that the government provide undergraduate students and institutions with substantial new support in scholarships, financial assistance, and incentives to assure success in science and engineering study by American students. Board members called for more federal support for graduate and postdoctoral research programs through improved stipends, benefits, and interdisciplinary opportunities. Pre-college teachers of mathematics, science, and technology also need better compensation, in-service training, and support as an integral part of the scientific and engineering professions. The Committee also encourages new initiatives and partnerships between the Community and academia in undergraduate and graduate research.

These recommendations are important, and their scope is wide. The IC must consider both its need for science and engineering talent and the role it must play in a national strategy to strengthen the nation's base of science and engineering professionals. The post-9/11 concern regarding foreign language skills must be joined now by the Community's participation in the creation of a stronger science and engineering base. Only such a commitment will allow the Community to meet the collection and analysis challenges described by the IRTPA 2004.

⁶ The Board serves as a policy oversight advisory body to the President and Congress on the state of US science and engineering research, education and workforce. The Board also provides oversight for the National Science Foundation (NSF), the independent federal agency that provides support to science and engineering research programs in almost all fields, and for math and science education programs nationwide.

⁷ See: "The Science and Engineering Workforce - Realizing America's Potential" at <http://www.nsf.gov/nsb/documents/2003/nsb0369/nsb0369.pdf>.

The Intelligence Workforce

Creating a National Intelligence Workforce – First Components

The IRTPA 2004 calls for improved workforce development, focused specifically on foreign language skills. The subsequent WMD Commission report goes further, calling for the creation of “a new human resources authority in the Office of the DNI to develop Community-wide personnel policies and overcome...systemic shortcomings.” The Commission also offers “specific proposals aimed at encouraging joint assignments between intelligence agencies, improving job training at all stages of an intelligence professional’s career, and building a better personnel incentive structure.” Specifically, the Commission recommends:

“...that the DNI use his human resources authorities to establish a central human resources authority for the IC; to create a uniform system for performance evaluations and compensation; to develop a more comprehensive and creative set of performance incentives; to direct a joint personnel rotation system; and to establish a National Intelligence University.”⁸

While the Committee is aware of work underway to create the National Intelligence University, we urge the Community to redouble its efforts to create a truly integrated intelligence workforce, starting with the performance evaluations and incentives for which the WMD Commission called. Precedent within the Community exists in work undertaken at the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency in the development of more contemporary human resource management systems. These efforts should be brought together now to build high and uniform standards, a common understanding among executives of all aspects of intelligence, and a cadre of professionals to manage the Community as an integrated national asset. The Committee believes such standards can be developed and promulgated this fiscal year. We also view as feasible within this fiscal year the development of a program to build a cadre of Community executives suited to the management of an integrated national intelligence capability, including creation and implementation of strategies for long-term investment, Community development, and resource deployment.

Within a larger strategy of Community-wide human development, the Community must also establish a more robust career development program for analysts. Several models exist, including those used by the military departments. Such approaches represent a combination of assignment management and professional education. The creation of the National Intelligence University, for which the WMD Commission called, can provide the basis of a structure of professional education aimed at creating an integrated cadre of analysts. Such a structure can and should be developed within the context of a common Community-wide development program for the analytic cadre. Such an educational structure can be used to rebuild the Community’s capacity for long-term and profound

⁸ See: <http://www.wmd.gov/report/report.html#chapter6>

research, in addition to its ability to focus on challenges and problems of immediate concern. As with the more general human development recommendations noted earlier, the Committee believes that both a development program for the creation of a Community-wide analyst cadre and a complementary structure of professional education can be put in place within one year.

The IRTPA 2004 notes that:

“The IC has difficulty recruiting and retaining individuals with critically important skill sets—such as technical and scientific expertise and facility with foreign languages—and has not adapted well to the diverse cultures and settings in which today’s intelligence experts must operate. We propose the creation of a new human resources authority in the Office of the DNI to develop Community-wide personnel policies and overcome these systemic shortcomings. We also offer specific proposals aimed at encouraging joint assignments between intelligence agencies, improving job training at all stages of an intelligence professional’s career, and building a better personnel incentive structure.”

The Committee sees these recommendations as fertile ground for swift implementation and places in which relatively modest investments made today can yield significant benefits within the next few years. Stronger academic partnership with universities today can yield a larger class of trained linguists and analysts with linguistic skills and understanding of other cultures (including their histories, traditions, and evolving world-views). In addition, the DNI should foster the Community’s responsibilities to building a stronger foreign language capability in our public schools, just as we urge the Community to accept responsibility for a portion of the national science and engineering strategy for which the National Science Board has called.

The Committee recognizes that these recommendations do not encompass the entire workforce: We recommend the DNI identify low density/high demand skills in which urgent investments should be made. We urge as well that the DNI make the strongest possible commitment to diversity and equal opportunity within the intelligence workforce. We do so for two reasons: First, it is the right thing to do, reflecting our nation’s highest standards of democracy, and second, increasing the diversity of workforce provides a wider aperture to needed linguistic, cultural, and other skills necessary to master the global intelligence environment. The increasingly cultural diversity that characterizes the ranks of our nation’s science and engineering leaders—and the benefits that diversity has yielded to our national technological base—should encourage us to action in this regard.

We believe that program plans for all of these recommendations can be made within the current fiscal year, with implementation starting in the first subsequent fiscal year.

Operational Concepts

Joint Intelligence Task Forces - Integrating Intelligence Operations

Implicit within the WMD Commission's call for an integrated Community is the need for more fully integrated intelligence operations representing the full range of disciplines. Such integration is, in fact, necessary, if the Community is to meet the needs of an evolving customer community equipping itself with new operational concepts, such as the Joint Transformation Roadmap.

One approach to integrated operations—ranging from the front lines of collection, operations, and customer support to national analytic resources—we recommend for urgent consideration is the joint intelligence task force concept. Such an approach integrates operations and sets clear accountability and command authority—without compromising the specialized skills of its components or jeopardizing affiliation with parent agencies. Such an approach resembles closely and could be synonymous with the “virtual community of specialists to address a particular task” described by the WMD Commission.

Implementing this approach relies on four fundamental elements:

First, a joint intelligence task force requires a sound concept of operations. The Committee believes a lead element should be appointed at the level of the ODNI or within a specific agency for each mission (comprising a specific intelligence question or problem or interrelated set of issues.) In all cases, the lead element, designated by the DNI, must be given resource management authority, applicable at all levels, unfettered by the organizational prerogatives of individual agencies. In support of a specific mission, the DNI would direct each agency to commit resources of the required composition and quantity. If necessary, the DNI would build joint intelligence task forces in concert with the Secretary of Defense. Clearly, this approach relies on the development of an operational concept. The Committee believes that such a concept (or set of concepts) can be developed and put into implementation within the current fiscal year.

Second, a joint intelligence task force can be implemented and managed most successfully by intelligence executives whose career development and training have formed by the integrated human development strategy discussed previously and by equipping it with analysts furnished from the Community-wide analyst cadre also noted. We believe that the first executives and analysts so equipped can be made available to the Community within two years, at most, given a vigorous start of the development of a common developmental approach for intelligence executives and swift commitment to the deployment of an integrated Community-wide analyst cadre. Programs and structures to create both the requisite executive and analyst cadres can be put in place this fiscal year.

Third, the Community must redouble its efforts to build Community-wide mission management capabilities that can allocate dynamically collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, production, and customer support resources currently committed to

today's specific disciplines (for example, imagery, SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT...) and missions (for example, counterterrorism). In the long term, Community integration requires these integrated mission management capabilities. In the short term, the National Counter Terrorism Center would benefit significantly from such a commitment. The Committee is aware of the difficulties associated with gaining and sustaining Community-wide support for these capabilities. We recommend the DNI demonstrate to the Community his strongest commitment in this regard.

Finally, the DNI should employ joint intelligence task forces for specific missions of limited duration and scope. We should resist the temptation to institutionalize a task force against long-standing intelligence challenges, creating organizations that are both *ad hoc* and enduring, ill-equipped to undertake sustained intelligence research or to build sound, long-term relationships with customers. Joint intelligence task forces should reflect virtual affiliation and management. New task forces should be constituted with fresh resources against dynamic challenges. Task forces should be shut down swiftly upon the achievement of the operational results against which they are established. Longer term intelligence challenges should be addressed by more permanently constituted organizations, equipped with sound administration and staff functions, either within current agencies or constituted of resources managed at the Community level by mission managers with Community-wide authority.

Strengthening Tradecraft—Near-Term Initiatives

The WMD Commission notes the need for improvements in intelligence tradecraft. *Sound tradecraft* is essential at every stage of intelligence, from mission management through collection, processing, and exploitation, from analysis and production through dissemination. At the same time, *evolving tradecraft* is crucial to the success of the Community, given the changing nature of intelligence targets, the challenges presented by new the proliferation of advanced information technology, and the opportunities created by new doctrine, concepts, techniques, and technologies. In this regard, the Committee makes two specific recommendations, the foundations of which can be laid in the current fiscal year.

First, tactical HUMINT can be made stronger. We have learned that intelligence in support of tactical forces can spell the difference between mission success and needless loss of the lives of friendly forces and non-combatants. Of equal, if not greater, importance is the need for truly excellent intelligence—accurate, pertinent, and timely—in support of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. When tactical HUMINT works, its successes are noteworthy and often decisive.

The Committee urges the DNI, in concert with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI), to establish programs to:

- 1 Strengthen tactical HUMINT tradecraft and build an integrated set of operational concepts applicable across the Community, including its defense components.
- 2 Ensure tactical HUMINT concepts are consistent with new and evolving operational concepts, for example, the Joint Transformation Roadmap.

- 3 Improve throughout the services and in the civilian agencies the training of tactical HUMINT officers and enlisted members.
- 4 Build stronger incentives and opportunities for upward mobility for these personnel.
- 5 Develop and deploy new technologies applicable to HUMINT operations and support.

Steps 1 through 3 can be started this fiscal year. A program for steps 4 and 5 can be developed this fiscal year, for submission in the next budget cycle and Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). We believe the first improvements in tactical HUMINT capability can be realized within two fiscal years.

Second, the Community would be well-served by more operational attributes that enable adaptive collection and analysis in times of greater uncertainty. Such attributes, which are those often attributed to Special Operations Forces (SOF), emphasize the ability to allocate and reallocate collection, processing, exploitation, analytic, and other resources dynamically. Contemporary organizational management techniques, some of which have been pioneered in industry, make possible swift and flexible resource management, often on a global scale. New information technologies, some developed within the domain of supply chain management, can be applied to the command and control or mission management of intelligence resources.

The Committee believes that this fiscal year the Community can assess the needs for greater operational adaptability and flexibility. We view it is feasible to establish a plan of actions and milestones to provide new increments of capability focused on adaptability and flexibility this fiscal year, with the first new capabilities being made available within two fiscal years.

Conclusion

This white paper provides recommendations for actions that can be undertaken within the current fiscal year. Such actions, if undertaken swiftly, can lead to initial results within two fiscal years, if not sooner. We believe these actions, while bold in some regard, represent few, if any, changes to current statutes or organizational alignments. They do, in some cases, alter the balance of organizational prerogatives. In the case of science and technology, they reflect the need for the Community to accept some portion of responsibility for the state of our national infrastructure and to create a vision and plan to meet that responsibility.

The stakes to our nation and the safety of our homeland have never been higher. The opportunities before the Community have never been greater. New leadership is in place; new mandates have been created; a new sense of urgency pervades the nation.

We have no choice. We must take “action this day.”