Background to Study

• Analysis and recommendations from 2007-2010 work of Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) HLS Team

• 60+ HLS practitioners
  – All with operational experience/line authority to execute HLS missions
  – Representing Federal, state, local government and private sector/NGO mission partners
  – LE, fire service, EM, military, USCG, Guard, health, public health, EMS, etc.
• PNSR congressionally funded by lines in FY07 NDAA Section 1049 and FY10 NDAA Section 1054
  – 2008 work performed at NDU/INSS
  – 2010 work performed to support National Security Professional Development Integration Office (NSPD-IO)
• 2011-12 support to HLS Team from Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
The National Security System

• A top-down, 20th century, Industrial Age governance model
  – Draws upon a history that began with 1916 National Preparedness and culminated with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986
  – Federal-centric governance solutions via:
    • Lead Federal agency
    • White House/interagency czar
1st Gen HLS Governance

• Post-9/11 legal instruments for homeland security governance (2002 HSA & 2004 IRTPA) primarily focused on Federal interagency structures and processes
  – DHS from 22 agencies—lead agency
  – ODNI overseeing 17 agencies—czar
The Problem

• Federal-centric homeland security governance a single point of failure
• Present structures and processes persistently fail to achieve true unity of effort among Federal, state and local government, private sector and NGO Homeland Security Enterprise mission partners
Symptoms

• Conflict over all-hazards risk prioritization
  – Federal orientation to terrorism vs. state/local orientation to natural disasters deemed as high-probability

• Inadequate state- and local-level capabilities for catastrophic operational planning
  – States and locals apply scarce resources to planning for routine high-probability

• Insufficient workforce cultures of collaboration
Consequence

• In this 21st century strategic environment, the strength of the National Security System model is now its primary fault

• The top-down, 20th century Federal-centric security governance system is a single point of failure
  – Potentially putting national continuity at risk
The Axes of Network-Federal Governance

• Horizontal Interagency Dimension

• Vertical Intergovernmental Dimension
Intergovernmental Governance Challenge

• Fundamental reality of our Federal Republic:
  – Shared sovereignty over a common people and common territory—Federal, state, local.

• Reinforces fault in National Security model:
  – President exercises no delegated authority over state and local jurisdictions, their organizations or personnel
  – They are not in the President's chain-of-command

Crucial difference between intergovernmental and Federal-level interagency structures and processes
Homeland Security
Precursor Disciplines

• Emergency Management
• Counterterrorism
• Civil Defense
• Mobilization
The Macro-Level Threat

SYSTEM DISRUPTION

“Complex interdependencies in the post-industrial age have exposed a different set of vulnerabilities throughout the civil societies of today. . . . Risks are just as likely to emanate from disruptions in global networks—for energy, communication, information, transportation—that are interlocked, allowing failures to cascade across networks, borders, and societies.”


THINK FUKUSHIMA
Causes

• Intentional actions by state, state-sponsored or non-state adversaries
• Unintentional accidents or the consequences of short-sighted public-, private-sector or criminal activities
• Acts of God or Mother Nature
The Solution

NETWORK GOVERNANCE

• "Networks empower people. A nation with a self-reliant citizenry makes not for a single point of failure but rather competitive advantage and continued global engagement."

Declaratory DHS/FEMA and White House Policy

• From homeland security to homeland "security and resilience" (*Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, 2010)
• FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate’s bottom-up vision of "community resilience networks"
• *QHSR* intent:
  – “Build a homeland security professional discipline"
  – Develop "the homeland security community of interest at all levels of government as part of a cadre of national security professionals"
Toward Empowered Regional Network Nodes

• DHS/FEMA Preparedness Task Force (2010) recommended revitalizing and networking FEMA Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) to serve as "regional nodes" for providing regional perspectives for national policy and guidance, affording non-federal officials the means for "policy initiation, policy review, and policy implementation and monitoring"
  – Note the term “policy initiation”

• Public-private networks already embrace regionalization
  – FEMA Region III's All Hazards Consortium and the National Capital Region (NCR)
    • NCR Homeland Security Strategic Plan cited by the 2008 FEMA Regional CONOPS as a good model for cross-jurisdictional coordination
The Threefold Solution

1. Find all-of-nation means to move beyond declaratory policy to implement and execute existing national preparedness authorities for security and resilience

2. Broadly engage industry, private sector and NGO mission partners

3. Establish Federal government's Constitutional responsibility for resourcing and facilitating regional intergovernmental administration of national preparedness activities

   As a substitute for preparedness grants—where appropriate
Implement via HLS Workforce

• Leverage recently revived efforts of the National Security Professional Development Integration Office (NSPD-IO) in OPM to implement the 2007 EO 13434, "National Security Professional Development," among the Federal emergency management community with its National Capital Region pilot

• Leverage lessons learned from Goldwater-Nichols re the "joint-duty requirement“

• Establish in each FEMA region a Regional Preparedness Staff as an intergovernmental “unified staff” analogous to DoD's Joint Staff
Include Non-Federal IPAs in NSPD System

- Prioritize expeditionary use of Federal, state and local government, private sector and NGO personnel as Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) personnel in rotational assignments to these ten Regional Preparedness Staffs
  - Private sector and NGO personnel to serve as special government employees (SGEs)
Regional Preparedness Staff Responsibilities

- Serve as the vanguard for developing a collaborative culture across the "network federal" security and resilience workforce in the Homeland Security Enterprise

- Facilitate joint interagency/intergovernmental collaboration for developing and sustaining capabilities to conduct:
  - Catastrophic risk assessment, operational planning and exercise validation
  - Inventories of catastrophic capabilities and negotiated processes to identify gaps and target grants and other resources
  - Regional evaluations and self-assessments informed by regionally-determined performance metrics
Membership
(Notional based on Region III RAC)

- state emergency management directors
- UASI core city designees
- rural area rep
- fire services rep
- EMS rep
- local LE rep
- state LE rep
- public works rep
- IAEM regional rep
- education rep
- volunteer groups rep
- hospital rep
- university research rep
- TAG rep
- public health rep
- local/county government rep
- elected official
- Chamber of Commerce or other appropriate business association reps (by invitation)
- Coast Guard districts
- FBI SACs
- U.S. Attorneys
1. Resource and empower DHS/FEMA-facilitated Regional Preparedness Staffs—either under existing authorities or, working with lawmakers, by statute

2. Reprogram FEMA program funds to develop concept, program estimate and implementation plan—optimally to yield a cost benefit; at a minimum to be budget neutral
1. Hold hearings on the need and ideas for next-gen HLS intergovernmental structures and processes leading to a Network Governance model for 21\textsuperscript{st} century challenges and opportunities

2. Request GAO to do a comparative cost analysis to assess current program management and preparedness grant program costs at all three levels of government relative to the costs of the proposed Regional Preparedness Staffs
Current Efforts

• Furthering implementation by supporting education efforts of:
  – Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
  – National Governors Association
  – Ridge Global
  – DomesticPreparedness.com
Intrastate
Network Federalism

• Regional Resilience Collaborative Networks
  – How to maintaining capabilities in Tier II UASIs
  – The Preparedness Grant Priority

• DomPrep Action Plan: Building Resilient Regions for a Secure and Resilient Nation (NOV 2012)

Grant Reform

• A focus of congressional hearings in the spring
• A priority for the National Governors Association and GHSAC
• Grants will probably target sustaining collaborative capabilities, training, education and exercises, and collaborative use of equipment
• UASI grants will continue to decline
Discussion

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Next-Generation Homeland Security: Network Federalism and the Course to National Preparedness (available also as Ebook)