Interagency Challenges Explored

Members of the Joint Warfighting Conference panel discussing how to make interagency collaborate more effectively spoke candidly, not only about the serious problems and misunderstandings in this area, but also about the demanded for significant changes. These changes must occur sooner rather than later because believing that interagency operations will disappear once operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are over is foolish. Interagency cooperation is the new normal, they all agreed. Vice Adm. Doug Crowder, USN (Ret.), introduced this view by explaining that the military must accept that operations involve many agencies and not just USAID and ambassadors. Country teams comprising members of different organizations need to be developed and educated about how to operate with each other. "We're nowhere near that yet," Adm. Crowder stated. Lt. Gen. John Wood, USA (Ret.), pointed to the extreme difference in cultures as a major part of the problem of interagency cooperation. Though an obvious point, Gen. Wood elaborated that even the language is so different that it is difficult to communicate. While the military refers to troops, the civilian world calls employees personnel; while the military accomplishes missions, civilian agencies speak about programs; and while the military rewards its members for serving in combat areas, civilian personnel cannot count on overseas duty as a career booster. One of the most evident and perhaps disrupting differences is financing. While the U.S. Defense Department must describe in detail each project it needs funding for and exactly how much money that must be, civilian agencies are handed an overall budget that they are responsible to use as they see fit. "It is hard to get budget and planning hooked to political will," the general said. Linda Specht, deputy director, Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Near East Asia Bureau, U.S. State Department, agreed that the difference in cultures is a prime reason for interagency collaboration difficulties. She explained that many military leaders do not realize that the number of State Department personnel is few in most locations, so responding to military demands quickly is not possible. This situation causes frustration both for the military and the civilian agencies. Most military leaders also do not understand that the actions they take that have second and third order effects may not be their concern, but it is a concern for agency personnel who do not rotate out of the area after 12 months but rather stay in an area and must deal with those lasting effects. James Kunder, senior resident fellow, German Marshall Fund of the U.S., offered a four-point plan to help agencies work better together. First, the military and agencies need more forces. One primary example is U.S. Africa Command, which has thousands of personnel at the headquarters in Germany but only 433 military officers throughout the entire continent of Africa. Kunder's second point was that there is a need for an expeditionary capacity. Efforts in this area began during the last administration, but it has lost traction and needs to be revitalized, he stated. To this same point, Kunder called for a coordinated effort across the multi-array of agencies that a commander is likely to meet during a crisis. This applies to NATO of civilian agencies as well. Finally, there needs to be "massive increases in training for the civilians. We don't train them in other military counterparts; don't train them in working with others of other agencies," Kunder proposed.