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Trolling for Data Amid the Rise of Societal Roulette

Not long ago, network-centric warfare (NCW) theologians stated that the information advantage generated by information technology could provide a new competitive warfighting advantage on tomorrow’s battlefield. For the first time in the history of warfare, geographically dispersed forces would be completely networked and thus much more effective. Other terms soon followed to operationalize the theory, such as information/knowledge superiority and information dominance. These terms were operationally refreshing, philosophically mesmerizing and intellectually seductive.
By Cmdr. Gregory E. Glaros, USN (Ret.)

Not long ago, network-centric warfare (NCW) theologians stated that the information advantage generated by information technology could provide a new competitive warfighting advantage on tomorrow’s battlefield. For the first time in the history of warfare, geographically dispersed forces would be completely networked and thus much more effective. Other terms soon followed to operationalize the theory, such as information/knowledge superiority and information dominance. These terms were operationally refreshing, philosophically mesmerizing and intellectually seductive.

But as a new defense industry emerged to capitalize on NCW-related funding, the technology built on this premise hardly created the knockout punch that was promised. It was argued that if military forces possessed such data-rich insight into the battlefield—garnered by networked connectivity—then they would succeed without failure. If the forces could effect change faster because of the networked ability to communicate all activities between every node, then the opponent would be defeated. The three-week-long “shock and awe” campaign to Baghdad in 2003 appeared to provide a clear vindication of this emerging theory of war. So, what happened since then, and what mistakes do we continue to make? Are the theorists, military leadership and the acquisition community to blame, or was it simply political blunder?

Unfortunately, events that preceded the Global War on Terrorism and the challenges that continue today in Iraq and Afghanistan were neither an indictment of any warfare theory nor the result of impotent politics. Instead, these events gave the United States a timeless critique: Arrogance is coupled directly with failure; information without context is only data; and knowledge of a situation, no matter how insightful, cannot be acted upon coherently without organizational alignment. In addition, without quantitatively understanding relationships within complex socio-political systems, without the ability to identify the stakeholders in these systems or without the capacity to recognize how key issues influence local and global environments, effective and rational policy decisions will continue to be an illusion. And, these effective policy decisions will remain elusive, no matter how much is spent on armored vehicles, networked capabilities, intelligence collection or data storage systems.

Current operational failures are leading to a concentrated effort to buy more defensive armor to counter a constantly adapting threat, as well as to outsource security to offset military casualties and relieve the strain of long deployments. While these efforts are necessary salves, they cannot keep U.S. forces safe for long and will not protect a nation from harm. Lack of political clarity in socially opaque regions and limited access to a closed theo-political culture greatly increase the need to gather more intelligence and to store and mine more data in the hope of detecting some causal pattern useful against adversaries. But how do these efforts gain insight about intent?

While expert studies and subjective opinions are widely available—and accessible information on any one subject is growing exponentially—formative, quantitative methods to help shape and create stabilizing policy in ungovernable regions do not exist. Filling servers with more data, crafting clever algorithms to discern relationships between data nodes and developing stunning mosaics that map data interactions are only the start. Without reconciling the embedded nuances and interrelationships within social networks, it is questionable whether progress can be made to prevent either operational failures or strategic defeat.

In the social realm, human interactions, relationships and networks best describe societal intent. What links individuals to social networks are interdependencies: values, ideas, kinship, dislikes, conflicts, trade, theology or ideology. The resulting social networks operate on many levels, from individuals to tribes and from tribes to nations. All of them play a crucial role in determining the way problems are solved and the degree to which the social network succeeds in achieving individual or collective objectives.

The recent advent of online social network services, built on this premise, provides policymakers with the opportunity to view the birth of virtual nations. These online “cultures” showcase communities that share common interests and activities, that are interested in exploring the interests and activities of others, and that use the Web to organize activities or persuade those who are not yet members to join. The Web is full of these social networks: MySpace, Facebook, Twitter and Friendster are just a few of the more popular sites, each possessing different perspectives and intent. They are no different from nations that occupy a place within the United Nations—only they do not make war—just yet.

The rise of social network analysis and game theory provides some clarity to the inside functions of social networks. But the United States is no closer to preventing future catastrophe than it was on September 10, 2001, if it cannot determine a direct causal effect of its policies on emerging social networks. As any statistician knows, scanning databases for perceived relationships then crafting an interesting explanation is no different from dredging—the channel may be cleared, but what is left is contaminated slough that exists only to poison those that remain.