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Muddy Boots Plow the Path to Change

The U.S. Army is taking the offensive in developing new methods of deploying innovative technologies to its fighting men and women in the Global War on Terrorism. This effort spans the range from rapid insertion of military off-the-shelf technologies to acquisition reform itself, as the Army accepts that the old ways of procurement will not work either in a rapidly changing battle environment or a dynamic technology arena.

With the U.S. military actively fighting on two fronts in Southwest Asia, support to the warfighter dominates the agenda of defense agencies and organizations throughout the military. But with the most personnel actively involved in the fighting, the U.S. Army faces the greatest imperative for responding to warfighter needs quickly and effectively. Thousands of boots on the ground are showing the way for both a new direction in military technology and a new way of speeding that technology into the force.

Theory became fact shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks that thrust the United States into the war on terrorism. Many information technology systems developed for network-centric warfare were called upon to link forces in joint operations, and they quickly proved their worth. Warfighters using these networking technologies were able to develop unanticipated new capabilities, and the call went out for more technologies.

After early successes in driving the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and ending Saddam Hussein’s reign in Iraq, the military found itself in protracted battles with an enemy that changed the rules of combat to suit its own needs and capabilities. Adaptation became the rule of the battlespace, as both sides sought to keep one step ahead of what they viewed as an innovative adversary.

For the U.S. Army, that meant learning how to adapt network-centric capabilities to the grittiness of urban warfare. Added to that was the enemy’s adoption of its own technological edge—improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Suddenly, information technology was being asked to change with the changing battlespace. Necessity truly had become the mother of invention.

So decision makers in the Army, as well as those throughout the Defense Department, focused on speeding new technologies to the warfighter. This required stepping outside of normal acquisition and procurement procedures that would have delayed technology insertion beyond the point of usefulness. New systems were developed from existing military and commercial off-the-shelf technologies and capabilities for rapid deployment to the front.

This approach, however, illuminated a potential contradiction: exigency versus planning. The Army had long-standing, carefully developed plans for advancing its state of the art in communications and networking. New systems being sped to the front threatened to leave the Army with a new generation of stovepipes that the extant programs were designed to eliminate. So, Army planners had to keep one eye on the service’s long-term plans while they worked to deploy new technologies inside the acquisition curve. In some cases, such as with the Joint Network Node and the Warfighter Information Network–Tactical, the Army was able to fold a new technology into an existing program.

Juggling these two challenges has pointed the way to a new issue that the Army is facing head-on. Needs can change faster than plans, and the rapid pace of technological change—along with the shifting trends of battlefield demands—requires a new way of procuring communications and information technologies. Instead of designing broad-based interoperable networks built around long-term progress, the Army is looking at designing its future networks and large information systems with change in mind.

Networks would be planned around a baseline system that would provide a home for innovations. The design would anticipate that unforeseen advances would need to be included, and it would incorporate them without fear of conflict with original plans. Expected advances would be accommodated, but there would be no problem adding supplemental technologies or capabilities.

This approach would provide the necessary wiggle room for the Army to insert unplanned technologies and capabilities as they become evident or are requested by the force. No stovepipes would emerge because the architecture would permit incorporation of all innovations.

What remains is for planners to determine how to build this type of architecture. However, the challenge may be more philosophical than technical. Similar challenges have been faced in the past, and most have been overcome. The Army’s path to the future has emerged from the dusty trails of Iraq and Afghanistan, and it points to a much more technologically capable and responsive force.

The Editor

More information on U.S. Army technologies is available in the August 2009 issue of SIGNAL Magazine, in the mail to AFCEA members and subscribers July 31, 2009. For information about purchasing this issue, joining AFCEA or subscribing to SIGNAL, contact AFCEA Member Services.