From Bombers to Bytes: Rethinking Cyber Operations in Light of the Russia-Ukraine War

Since Desert Storm, military thinkers and futurists have increasingly believed cyber operations were on the cusp of upending the character of war. Their logic was simple but powerful: the revolutionary operations could bypass armed forces and strike directly at civilian and economic targets to cripple their enemy, either shortening wars or preventing them altogether. The proliferation of computing and the dependency on networking in modern life only increased their fears of cyber-Pearl Harbors and wars that both begin and end in cyberspace. Fortunately, American theories about the role and nature of cyber warfare in major combat operations remain largely untested due to the lack of great power conflict. However, it is not the first time American thinkers have had to anticipate the effects that a new technology will have on warfare, nor must they wait for their own combat opportunities to refine and assess their thinking. The war in Ukraine provides a unique first look at how cyber operations impact modern war. 

Around the turn of the 20th century, the airplane also seemed on the verge of changing the face of warfare. The possibility of deterring or shortening wars by overflying armed forces to cripple a nation’s economic or societal centers of gravity attracted great interest from military thinkers. By the early 1930s, American and British airmen developed similar theories regarding the decisiveness of strategic bombing that focused on attacking critical targets to destroy a nation’s will and ability to fight. The concepts rested on seemingly obvious assumptions about the fragile and interconnected nature of advanced economies, as well as the frailty of citizens who have grown accustomed to the conveniences of modern life. They differed primarily in whether civilian or economic targets would prove the decisive mechanism. Nevertheless, they largely agreed that they could achieve relatively greater political outcomes with relatively fewer resources than other warfighting forces. 

Unfortunately, their theory proved seriously flawed. Societies and economies were far more resilient than anticipated in the face of massive air assaults and the war ended only after widespread destruction and years of fighting. Their conceptions not only resulted in significant losses once introduced to the crucible of war, but they also directly impacted the development of airpower long after the war. 

While the lack of major American wars prevented airmen from testing their theories before WWII, they were not completely devoid of data to test the assumptions and causal mechanisms underpinning them. The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) provided a rich case study in modern warfare given the wide array of modern weaponry, combat involvement from three major powers, and moderately large air forces equipped with the latest aircraft. Air power in the war proved highly effective in several mission areas, from airlift to defensive counter-air to interdiction of transport lines. However, strategic bombing did not produce the desired effects against adversary will. The bombing of Guernica and massive air raids against Barcelona in 1938 caused significant damage and casualties, but contrary to predictions, they enraged Republicans and hardened resistance rather than breaking it.

Unfortunately, Army Air Corps airmen proved largely dismissive of the war. Their confidence in the theory of precision strategic bombing against economic targets appeared to have a significant impact on their interpretations of the war. Put simply, the lack of results from strategic bombing led them to believe there was little to learn from the fighting. The Air Corps semi-official journal carried only two brief editorials and one article about the war during the entire three-year conflict. In them, Brig. Gen. Henry H. Arnold cautioned against drawing too many lessons given that strategic bombing did not play a major factor. Maj. George Kenney dismissed the bombing campaigns as too small to inform concepts of modern warfare. Where they did discuss lessons from the war, they tended to highlight those that reinforced their theories. They argued that the improved speed and armament of bombers throughout the war demonstrated the inherent offensive nature of airpower. The strengthened resistance in the face of civilian bombing confirmed their beliefs that economic and industrial infrastructure were more effective targets for strategic bombing than the population. In the end, the war did little to change the direction of thought within the Army Air Corps.

Interesting parallels exist today for cyber operations. Pundits and military leaders alike have long salivated or panicked over the imagined possibilities of cyber operations both before and throughout a conflict. Cyber attacks could target critical infrastructure as a surprise opening salvo to sow chaos among a population and force a government to acquiesce to an aggressor’s demands. Moreover, they could support operations in other domains during a fight by disrupting logistical flows into a theater of war, disabling an integrated air defense system, or incapacitating electrical and mechanical systems in naval vessels. As early as 1976, analysts were noting the reliance of modern weapon systems on information sources for successful engagements, whether it be intelligence, targeting information, or command and control orders. That dependency created the possibility that weapon systems could be defeated through information denial, corruption or spoofing. Of course, these changes produced both opportunities and vulnerabilities—the operations could cut both ways. 

The invention of the microchip and the rapid proliferation of networking throughout weapon systems only further intensified the fears and excitement about cyber operations. Cyber terrain expanded exponentially with visions of a digital and interconnected force teaming with autonomous weapon systems to engage targets. As a result, many members in the armed forces today believe cyber operations will play a significant and pervasive role in modern warfighting.

The War in Ukraine is challenging those notions. Despite widespread expectations of a decisive or at least disruptive cyber campaign accompanying Russia’s invasion, cyber operations have thus far produced limited observable effects on either the battlefield or Russia’s strategic objectives. The war began with the anticipated barrage of attacks, but they proved episodic and short-lived, with minimal enduring impact on Ukrainian military operations. 

The most frequently cited exception was a wiper attack against satellite communications provider ViaSat, which permanently disabled thousands of modems across Ukraine and parts of central Europe. In a highly publicized quote regarding the attack, a senior cyber official in Ukraine called it “a really huge loss of communications at the beginning of the war.” However, he later clarified that the attack produced only limited effects on operations due to the Ukrainian use of satellite communications as a secondary communications pathway to wired means. Rather than paralyzing Ukrainian command and control, the attack instead underscored the challenge of achieving systemic effects through cyber means. 

The available evidence suggests Russian cyber operations have played only a marginal role in shaping the course of the conflict. Although Russia seemingly released the dogs of cyberwar, they appear to have refrained from barking, let alone biting. This does not imply an absence of cyber activity—on the contrary, Russia has had very active cyber operations throughout the war and possesses ample technical capability. Rather, it suggests a gap between anticipated and realized effects. Just as ideas about the bomber always getting through died with radar and pursuit aircraft, ideas about the electron always getting through seem to be found wanting in the face of a relentless and resilient Ukrainian cyber defense. Aided by lessons learned from previous attacks and robust support from international partners, defenders have limited a powerful cyber adversary to largely spray-painting graffiti on digital subway cars, to steal a phrase from Michael Hayden.

Of course, as with previous attempts to glean insights from foreign wars about the changing character of war, pitfalls abound. There is a reason most of the great powers failed to learn and implement major lessons from the Spanish Civil War—it is very difficult to assess sources and operations amid continued fighting. It will likely be many years before analysts can conduct a complete analysis on the impact of cyber operations in the Russia-Ukraine war and provide a more nuanced understanding. 

There are also many possible explanations for the lack of impact. The classified nature of cyber operations naturally challenges any attempts to assess their effectiveness. Moreover, although Russia is a prominent geopolitical cyber operator, its cyber doctrine traditionally regards cyber operations as one component of information operations. They place much more emphasis on using cyber to affect the information space, whereas American forces tend to think more along the lines of using cyber as a means of destructive attack or in support of other lethal means. Thus, the relative absence of battlefield effects may reflect doctrinal preferences rather than operational failure. Finally, while the catastrophic attacks that many anticipated have not materialized, it remains possible that an attack will eventually get through and have the war-changing effects that many anticipated. Therefore, any conclusions reached by participants or observers of the war in Ukraine must be held loosely and subjected to continual reassessment as more data or experience becomes available. 

Nevertheless, the early returns from Ukraine suggest caution for those who believe cyber operations will transform warfare. At this point, kinetic operations continue to reign supreme on the battlefield and appear to be only indirectly supported by cyber attacks, with significant debate over the degree of that support. Policymakers and planners would be wise to delve deeper into the assumptions underpinning cyber thinking, the mechanisms that enable cyber effects, and the specific context of the war in which they are being employed to better leverage cyber operations in their own context.

The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Space Force, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Cameron L. Ross is an officer in the U.S. Space Force and a graduate of both the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and the U.S. Air Force Academy. He is an intelligence officer with expertise in signals and cyber intelligence, and he has published articles on cyber thinking, cyber deterrence, competition with China and military strategy.