Joint Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Spectrum Operations Need Work To Face Contested Environments

The U.S. Army has spent the last 10 years or so bringing its cyber and electromagnetic activities (CEMA) and electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) into its warfighting in ways not seen before. Electronic warfare, spectrum operations, signaling and cyberspace operations—through Army career fields such as electronic warfare specialists (17Es or 29Es)—provide crucial capabilities to units.

However, what exists in that military service must integrate with the joint force. The adversarial environment has evolved to challenge comfortable, uncontested signal, electronic warfare (EW) and cyber operations. What is needed now is the joint ability to conduct CEMA and EMSO across the world with the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Space Force, not to mention with U.S. allies and international partners.

It is a tall ask, several noncommissioned officers offered, speaking at AFCEA International’s annual TechNet Augusta conference, held Aug. 19-22 in Augusta, Georgia.

“I have yet to see it done seamlessly,” said Command Sgt. Maj. Kevin J. Foutz, USA, Military Intelligence Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. “I know that's the great challenge of it.”

The stakes are incredibly high, the leaders warned. Because frankly, in a contested spectrum environment, U.S. warfighters and partners will have only seconds before they are found, said Sgt. Maj. Jesse Potter, USA, G3, U.S. Army Cyber Command.

“In 2023, Brig. Gen. Vile stated during the Maneuver Warfighter Conference, ‘If you remember nothing else, remember eight minutes,’” Sgt. Maj. Potter reported, speaking of Brig. Gen. Brian Vile, the deputy director of future operations and the J-3 at U.S. Cyber Command.

“He said, ‘You are going to learn two things in eight minutes: how good were your MCOMs [military communications] and how good are your adversaries’ EW soldiers.’ Fast forward one year and a couple of months later, based on the exponential growth of both our capabilities and our adversaries’ technologies, I would say that you now have about 80 seconds for our adversaries to sense and geolocate you.”

Once located, how long U.S. warfighters have to survive is based on an adversary's choice of kill chain and weapon system, Sgt. Maj. Potter said.

As such, the U.S. military must address joint CEMA and EMSO training needs, large-scale exercises that practice operating as a joint force in a contested environment, joint integration and technology deconfliction, and iron out cultural shifts, the leaders stated.

For example, Sgt. Maj. Foutz said services use different lingo for describing EW and other spectrum effects to the point where it can cause confusion. Years ago, when working with an Air Force platform, an Army commander did not think an EW effect was applied even though it was successful—given a misunderstanding of the Air Force’s terms and approach.

“It is really expectation management issues and communication issues when trying to integrate across the different forces,” Sgt. Maj. Foutz stated. “Luckily, in this case, it didn't affect the mission. Everything was still a success, thankfully, but it demonstrated right there that we need to integrate this. And before we do these things, we need to run this through real world mission, real world training, and demonstrate this capability so that it's seamlessly integrated.”

Even having differing technology presents a problem, said Master Sgt. Oladapo S. Agboola, USA, U.S. Army Signal School.

“One of the challenges we face is interoperability, and that happens at multiple levels, even within our Signal Corps,” Master Sgt. Agboola noted. “We’ve got one unit with this new piece of equipment and this other unit using this other piece of equipment all across our branches. The Army has equipment that cannot talk to Navy equipment, or we only have one radio that the Air Force can use if they want to talk to our ground troops.”

Moreover, the United States has to get to a point where it is interoperable enough within itself before being able to do large-scale CEMA and joint EMSO in combat operations with allies and partners.

“When we're fighting with Britain or France or Germany, against a common enemy, these countries have radio systems, not totally different, but they use different spectrum bandwidth,” Master Sgt. Agboola continued. “And their commander might want to use something that interferes with something we really want to use. How do we get around that? We have to work together. We have to breed familiarity.”

For Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Ruben Montano, cyberspace warfare technician, Joint Cyber Operations Group, North Squadron, it is “a common, shared understanding of the approaches to EMS [electromagnetic spectrum] and ensuring that we know we are not stepping on each other in the EMS as we are operating in, by and through it. That is going to be critical to our success. It is about how we scale EMS into large-scale exercises where we are operating together and seeing what each service is bringing to the fight. We have to actually do it. We have to actually put ourselves to those paces.”

“From a joint EW viewpoint, failure in the EMS has lethal consequences,” Sgt. Maj. Potter stressed. “We as an Army are just starting to realize this. If you fail to dominate in the EMS, that petty officer who sits in the CIC [combat information center] who's not able to protect the USS Carl Vinson from an anti-ship missile using advanced ES [electronic support] capability is going to result in the loss of an aircraft carrier and 6,000 sailors.”

In this day and age, electronic protections, whether it is with EW, cyber or other EMS operations, are critical.

“With electronic protection, we are observing this in Ukraine right now, every time President Zelenskyy has any type of speech, he is constantly saying protection is the most important warfighting function,” stated Sgt. Maj. Joshua Gendron, USA, U.S. Army North. “He is saying, ‘I cannot do maneuver, I cannot do artillery, I cannot conduct intelligence operations in the absence of protection.’ Electronic protection is critically important.”

Lastly, the noncommissioned officers advised senior leaders to make sure spectrum warfare is taken into consideration at the beginning of warfare planning.

“CEMA, JEMSO [joint EMSO] officers, they need a seat at the table,” Master Sgt. Agboola emphasized. “They need to be heard by the commander so he understands the tradeoffs when he's picking a course of action.”

And in return, warfighters need to provide specific CEMA and JEMSO deliverables to commanders.

“We should develop a spectrum plan,” stated Sgt. Maj. Gendron. “We should be able to nominate and assign frequencies. We should be able to generate the joint communication electronics operating instructions ... We owe that to our soldiers.”