Having more ship program names than hulls in the water will not produce a better Navy.
Between 1870 and 1871, the European continent experienced the Franco-Prussian War, which gave no warning of what World War I would be like. But this “quaint” war did foreshadow the importance of logistics, the need for reliable lines of communication and the effect of rapid innovation on the battlefield. Neither World War II nor the Korean War prepared the United States for Vietnam, but losses in Southeast Asia did reinforce the significance of aligning policy with operations and restated the effect that politics has on tactics. More recently, the Gulf War victory and the three-week-long operation Iraqi Freedom “thunder run” to Baghdad provided little foresight into the insurgent warfare plaguing Iraq today, but they did demonstrate that operational success does not prevent strategic failure. Few lessons are needed to know that the only assurance that tomorrow brings is uncertainty and that speed of change is the only aspect that ensures survival. Warfare is a dynamic, two-sided contest in which adversaries relentlessly pursue the seams between the strengths of incumbent powers. Despite its technical prowess, historical success and methodical progress, is the U.S. Navy prepared for the unknown?
At the turn of the last century, Lord “Jackie” Fisher inherited the Royal Navy—the world’s most powerful navy, which absorbed nearly 50 percent of Britain’s budget to secure its vast frontiers. Adm. Fisher sought to restrain the naval budget in an age of social reform and prepare it for modern war. While he began his career on Lord Nelson’s flag ship HMS Victory, as first sea lord he was the driving force behind the first modern battleship, HMS Dreadnought, and the battlecruiser HMS Invincible that focused on speed at the expense of armor. These changes were intended to secure the British Empire for generations; yet the country’s vast maritime expenditures only ensured supremacy for barely two decades. Gunfire proficiency, tempered hulls, industrial capacity and economic might were not limited to the British sailor or the country’s people. No one could have imagined the decline of the British Navy, let alone the collapse of its empire. Is the U.S. Navy any different today?
While far more scholarly comparisons have been made regarding one civilization versus another, military history—like economic theory—is more about the performance through time rather than discrete victory or failure. The best goal is not to shed light on the past but instead to catalyze the need for a renewed analytical framework that enables the U.S. Defense Department to understand better the effect of change. In the absence of a unifying theory that characterizes past conflict, examining a nation’s military at discrete times—and engaging only in comparative static predictive analysis—overlooks the need for fundamental understanding of the way military powers evolve through time.
Current procurement strategies have become more concerned with the operational art of acquisition rather than with how warfare itself develops. Policy pundits prescribe the need for future programs without understanding how conflict develops. As the United States remains fixated on urban combat today, policymakers still do not recognize the complex interplay among global institutions, emerging technology and emigrating demography in the overall progress of economic change and resulting shift in the balance of power. Although counterinsurgency has become the leading military doctrine shaping policy and budgets, the Defense Department cannot afford to plan for a static military future—nor does it have the economic luxury to procure its Navy on Rodeo Drive. The cost overruns in LPD-17, LCS, DDG-1000, CVN-X and Deepwater programs are clear indictments of industrial stasis and government stagnation. If the past decade is any measure of ship procurement skills, then the U.S. Navy surely will be eclipsed by the superior shipbuilding skills of many competitors who wish to challenge it.
Global economies are inextricably linked to the sea. While the U.S. Navy serves to ensure the uninterrupted flow of global shipping, it is in danger of being unable to do so. Any perceived weakness certainly would embolden an adversary. Looming sea battles are the least likely scenario facing the United States. Instead, complexity and ambiguity are the hallmarks of today’s maritime security environment. Terrorism and piracy have increased the effect that transnational threats have on maritime commerce significantly. The disruption of the just-in-time logistic chain would have widespread implications for the global economy.
Are higher numbers, smaller hull forms, advanced composites, information architectures, railguns and high-speed vessels the answer? What must a future U.S. Navy look like to continue global prosperity? How does the United States decide on what its Navy should be? Because no one can predict the future, one thing is certain: A future Navy must be capable of adapting not only to change but also to the speed of change. Today, this is not possible.
