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MARS' Mission: Find a New Home, Continue Long-Standing Tradition of Service

The Military Auxiliary Radio System-MARS-has been a mainstay in military and civilian support communications for decades. Its value as a voluntary civilian entity under the umbrella of the ASD(NII) cannot be understated. But now that the ASD(NII) faces disbanding at the behest of Defense Secretary Gates, what does the future hold? MARS has several potential destinations, but what's the best fit? Where will MARS receive the support it requires to continue flourishing? Share your opinions and ideas here.
For decades, the military and specially trained civilian amateur radio operators of the Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS) have provided reliable zero-cost back-up communications to the U.S. Defense Department and armed forces. This civilian-military partnership has served the nation well. The U.S. military's reliance on sophisticated communications architectures and networks is a double-edged sword. It conveys distinct advantages to the armed forces. Yet the more sophisticated the technology, the more susceptible it becomes to unexpected failures, disruption or destruction from asymmetric threats, such as satellites' vulnerability to antisatellite warfare. Systems do fail and can be compromised. Therefore, reliable back-up communications are critical. In both war and peace, the military has benefited from a formal partnership with nearly 5,000 volunteer licensed civilian amateur radio operators who form the backbone of MARS. Though little-known outside amateur radio circles, this relatively "low-tech" means of back-up communication has a storied record of service to the military. In the days before cell phones, e-mail and the Internet, MARS was known for relaying messages of morale from service personnel stationed abroad. The MARS mission has evolved to support the U.S. government's post-9/11 emergency preparedness efforts. As a Defense Department-sponsored program separately managed and operated by the Army, Navy-Marine Corps and Air Force, the system has been recognized by senior Defense Department leadership and was recently reaffirmed in departmental guidance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In December 2010, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 4650.02 upgraded MARS (formerly the Military "Affiliate" Radio System) to an organized military "auxiliary," tasking it with providing contingency radio communications support not only to the Defense Department but also to civil authorities at all levels, in accordance with the department's homeland defense responsibilities. In addition, the secretaries of the military departments were tasked with reporting annually to the OSD on their respective MARS programs. In a February 2009 SIGNAL Connections article, "Amateur Radio Community Experts Crucial to Emergency Communications," I discussed how MARS could benefit from OSD's active guidance and oversight. Under the DoDI, primary policy oversight for emergency communications initiatives involving MARS was assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD[NII]). In April 2010, Acting ASD(NII) Cheryl Roby declared her strong support for the MARS program and commitment to broadening its role within the department and the combatant commands. The NII, however, is being eliminated as a result of the "efficiency initiatives" announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in August. Many of its functions will be transferred to the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics or elsewhere. Where MARS program oversight will reside after the organizational disestablishment of NII remains to be seen. But wherever it migrates, MARS operators remain ready to fulfill their contingency communications mission and to expand their relationship with the Defense Department and civil agencies. In addition to providing high frequency (HF) radio contingency communications support to the Defense Department, MARS operators support other elements of the U.S. government. For example, they actively participate in the National Communications System Shared Resources HF Radio Program, which promotes interoperability between more than 100 federal, state and private sector entities in support of national security/emergency preparedness. MARS members are experienced radio operators who communicate on military frequencies using both voice and digital modes. They voluntarily devote their time and resources to ensure the Defense Department has reliable contingency communications capability if needed, under all types of circumstances. The system also works with domestic civilian and emergency response organizations at the national, state and local levels to ensure reliable communications links during emergencies. This includes use of a global network of nodes to relay e-mail traffic via HF radio when Internet connectivity is unavailable. Several state and county emergency management offices also use MARS as the link between their civilian emergency management radio nets and military radio nets activated in an emergency. MARS operators provide support to individual military installations, as well as the National Command Authority. While MARS represents only a fraction of the communications assets and capabilities available to the Defense Department, interest has resurfaced within the military with regard to the HF radio spectrum MARS uses for the bulk of its operations. This resurgence is being channeled into a productive, expanding partnership between civilian radio operators and their uniformed counterparts, an outcome that should be encouraged and nurtured. With new Defense Department guidance, an expanded mission, a proven record of accomplishments, and a pool of talented and capable radio operators providing their services voluntarily, MARS is a communications asset that has attracted the attention and support of senior Defense Department leaders. Notwithstanding the uncertainties resulting from internal Defense Department decisions intended to reduce overhead, eliminate redundancies, streamline management and improve operational efficiencies, the value MARS provides to the Defense Department, civil agencies and the nation should remain strong for the foreseeable future. David J. Trachtenberg, president and chief executive officer of Shortwaver Consulting, is a former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and a member of Air Force MARS and SHARES.

Comment

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Re : Title should be MARS needs the RIGHT home! Considering all the variety of services we can and do provide, as well as collaborations with an alphabet soup of agencies and emergency services providers: MARS is a strategic asset! Who looks after our collective Strategic safety and security: Homeland Security, specifically FEMA. Note that back in the Cold War days FEMA ran a system of emergency HF radio stations throughout the CONUS to support contingency communications. More Comments? Come on guys...
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I agree with Maj. Sutphin that MARS is a "strategic asset." Yet of all federal entities involved with homeland security, DoD is arguably still the most capable and effective, which is why it tends to be called upon for functions that are outside its traditional core mission. The "M" in MARS reflects its status as a "military" auxiliary, and MARS is still best positioned to support the armed forces and Department of Defense as it currently does on a day-to-day basis. For example, MARS operators facilitate contacts and run phone patches between ground stations and military aircraft engaged in air-sea search and rescue, in-flight emergencies, hurricane hunting, and mid-air refueling missions. MARS is being integrated into the communications structure and activities of military installations. And the Pentagon MARS station provides contingency communications to the Joint Staff and the National Military Command Center, actively participating in communications exercises with DoD airborne assets. Of course this active military relationship doesn't preclude MARS from supporting civil agencies. In fact, the DoDI encourages this. Within OSD, support to civil authorities is under the responsibility of the ASD for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs. And the DoDI gives the ASD(HD&ASA) "primary responsibility" for the MARS role in this effort. Migrating MARS policy guidance and oversight to the ASD(HD&ASA) might be one way - but it is not the only way - to provide support to civil agencies while preserving MARS' military and DoD focus and maintaining OSD-level support and attention.
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MARS is an operations-oriented service. On a daily basis, the Air Force MARS Phone Patch Net runs official (80%) and morale (20%) phone patches for DoD airborne and ground based units. The joint MARS digital networks provide point-to-point as well as E-mail-over-HF capabilities to its military sponsors and, through the Defense Support to Civilian Authorities plan, to federal and state government agencies. Air Force, Navy/Marine Corps, and Army voice and digital nets are in daily operation and are used in military training exercises as well as for actual events. MARS subject matter experts routinely volunteer their knowledge in engineering and related fields to respond to requests for technical support from military units with whom working relationships have been established. Both the MARS program and the DoD would greatly benefit from thoughtful consideration being given to placing MARS under the oversight of the appropriate office that could continue to develop and expand the service that MARS can provide to the Department of Defense.
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I can think of only one element missing from David Trachtenberg's thoughtful survey of MARS capabilities. He offers no explanation, or even speculation, as to why the invaluable yet costless resources of the Military Auxiliary Radio System have been left unlinked from the chain of command at a time of preoccupation with homeland defense. Maybe it's the misperception that "hams" (not the most awe-inspiring of appellationa) are hobbyists, which is to be " preoccupied with a pet idea or cranky obsession," as Merriam-Webster puts it.. Well, admirals are hams: Edmund Peter Giambastiani, Jr., previous vice chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and John Scott Redd, until recently Director of the National Counterterrorism Center come to mind. Generals are hams: Curtis LeMay, to name an immortal. A Medal of Honor winner, too: Vice Adm. Lawson "Red" Ramage, WWII submarine hero. Lawmakers? There's the late Sen. Barry Goldwater, famously active on the air. Nobel Prizewinners, too, are hams: Joseph Taylor Sr., astrophysicist and co-discoverer of pulsars (one of three from the U.S.). Also university presidents: Lawrence S. Bacow of Tufts and James Garland, Miami University. Computer pioneers: Steve Wozniak of Apple. And the late Walter Cronkite, of course. This smattering of stars embellishes a constellation illuminated by tens of thousands of men and women dedicated to public service as a "hobby," and not just in MARS. Their use to homeland security consists of being available in virtually every corner of the country with all sorts of skills valuable in an emergency. MARS adds the elements of military organization, training and networks-in-being. Alas, we're victims of undetected cost-effectiveness as well as misinformed image. MARS costs the DoD very, very little. So it gets very, very little attention. Just imagine: Several thousand trained communicators who provide their own equipment and pay their own utility costs; who are spread across the 50 states within quick reach of natural disaster or hostile attack anywhere; often prepared to deploy the 48-72 hours it might take a FEMA MERS or National Guard JISCC to be fully emplaced; and raring' to be of service. But we're lost down in the chain of command's sub-basement, a great case study for military non-Transformation How long it takes DoD to glue the broken pieces of ASD(NII) back together should make another interesting case study. [William Sexton is a retired newspaper writer and editor, member of Army MARS since 1991, assistant director Region 1 (New England).]
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Both Mr. Edmonds and Mr. Sexton raise excellent points. Those unfamiliar with the expanded mission of MARS, its activities, and the capabilities of its volunteer operators may indeed have a misperception, as Mr. Sexton notes, of the valuable contribution it makes to the armed forces, the Department of Defense, and civil agencies. This can lead to an underutilization of MARS assets. Erroneous perceptions are often difficult to overcome. But the additional examples cited by Mr. Edmonds regarding the day-to-day operational activities of MARS provide a good summary of the kinds of support MARS provides and should help clarify its contenporary relevance for those who lack first-hand knowledge of MARS or are unfamiliar with its growing support to a range of U.S. government operations.
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I think that part of the problem is two fold: 1) Lack of awareness of what MARS is 2) What do I need to get the training required. While I have been a radio amateur for almost 30 years, and have equipment and antennas capable of operating in the MARS bands, I have never been asked by people who know that I am a "ham" on base to participate in the program. Furthermore, when I ask about how to get started, I get a blank stare. Some direct publicity at DoD facilities about MARS and its benefits would help. Where I work, I am not aware of any efforts on MARS, and some people are not even aware of this capability. Bert Rodriguez, KA2UUP Mendon MA
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Well, here's the problem, at least as exemplified in Army MARS. Although our mission is 99 percent homeland security, we're part of a command whose primary mission is overseas. You know, like Afghanistan. The linkage made sense back in the days of MARSgrams to and from Korea and Vietnam, but who wants free telegrams in the era of e-mail and cell phones? NETCOM/9th Signal Command (Army) has more important matters on its plate than publicizing MARS to the bases. A lot of members assumed DoDI 4650.02, some three years in the making, would deal with that organizational disconnect and also the anomaly of fielding three separate and uncoordinated MARS organizations (Army, Air Force and Navy-MC). NIMS (the National Incident Management System) firmly mandates unity of command for emergency response. Darn it, before ASD/NII could transform the DoDI into action, OSD transformed NII out of business. Long-awaited action DOA. OMG. Until somebody jumpstarts the replacement of NII-or better, puts the issue right to CIO/G6 (Chief Information Officer)-you can take action to join on your own initiative. Google MARS for information on applying. As a columnist on the subject, I know MARS is still looking for new members and actively training for action even while they wait to see who's going to run the show.
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As Mr. Rodriguez notes, greater visibility for and recognition of MARS at military installations and within the overall DoD community would indeed be beneficial. The positive April 2010 comments of the Acting ASD(NII) that I referenced in my original post occurred at a Pentagon meeting with the service MARS Chiefs and included representatives from the Air Force A6, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Joint Staff J3 and J6, HQMC C4, DISA, and U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). NII's desire to broaden the MARS civilian-military partnership within DoD was clearly evident, with NII proposing to interface with the various military commands regarding their current use (if any) of MARS assets, to inform them of the full suite of MARS capabilities available to them, and to encourage them to more actively tap into the pool of MARS expertise. This kind of senior OSD-level commitment to the program was encouraging and could help mitigate the problem Mr. Rodriguez highlights. How this will now advance, and who will advance it in the wake of NII's disestablishment, remain to be seen. The existence of multiple MARS programs separately managed and operated by the Military Departments should be no more of an impediment to the efficient utilization of MARS resources than the existence of multiple service branches is an impediment to operating jointly. An Incident Commander will not wonder whether to call the Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marines, but will look to DoD for support after an incident. It is DoD's job to efficiently and effectively coordinate and manage the military response. The same principle applies with respect to MARS, which is a DoD asset, and is reflected in the DoDI. While NETCOM/9th Signal Command may not be the ideal home for Army MARS, as Mr. Sexton suggests, greater coordination between the three services' MARS programs can be achieved through higher level guidance and direction within DoD.

I first became a MARS affiliate in 1965 or so; the ancient past as far as data transmission is concerned. I remember AFCEA conventions on Connecticut Ave. N.W where manufacturers would display HF power RF amplifiers and exotic wide band analog receivers. Much or our current day Federal and military work force have no experience or memory of such devices and if they do, the memories are filed away with those of signal flags, flashing lights, Morse code, cork life preservers, and other archaic and outdated technology. Over the years, MARS has evolved and, as eloquently stated her by others here, offers a reliable message system of thousands of message (data) insertion and distribution points throughout the world. With the disestablishment of ASD NII, senior defense officials are busy finding new homes for assets, responsibilities, and personnel. MARS is one of the assets, and, as we readers of this series know, an extremely valuable "Auxiliary" system that will serve the nation well in any emergency. The question to be answered is: Which DoD office should hold 'oversight' responsibilities, and which office should have operational control. If I were asked, I would recommend that MARS be assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Due to the international scope of MARS responsibilities, operational oversight becomes a bit tricky. Much of the CONUS oversight for the three Service programs might be provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense - Homeland Defense and American Security Affairs. Things get a bit fuzzy outside the US homeland and I welcome any ideas. NII has its hands full complying with the OSD memo disestablishing ASD NII. My sense is that the transfer of MARS is not on their radar at all. I entered a time warp when checking out the organizational chart on the OSD Director of Administration and Management web site. Suddenly I was back in the days of ASD (C3I). The warp lasted until I noticed that the last update was March 2008. Seems like the more things change the more things stay the same. In my first paragraph, I mentioned cork life preservers. Does a drowning person care if the life preserver thrown to them is "state of the art" or do they just want to be saved? To answer this question in the context of MARS we must first decide what MARS is not and what it can not do. Only then can we intelligently and convincingly define what MARS is! I'll start by stating MARS is not a replacement for normal DoD communication resources. Your turn. Peter F. Kean is the Director of the Neuro-Linguistic Programming Institute of Washington, D.C. He is a member of Navy MARS and served as a volunteer for MARS within OSD C3I
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Mr. Kean's observation that MARS "is not a replacement for normal DoD communication resources" is a useful reminder. Per DoDI 4650.02, MARS is a military "auxiliary" intended to provide "contingency radio communications support" to the DoD Components and U.S. government operations. It can be challenging to focus necessary attention on back-up capabilities when a variety of more technologically sophisticated primary means of communication exist. Nevertheless, DoD is fortunate to have a qualified, well-trained, and dedicated "reserve" of knowledgeable and capable volunteer MARS operators willing to serve the nation in this capacity. Effectively utilizing this capability is the paramount issue. Placing MARS oversight within the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy organization, as Mr. Kean recommends, would certainly be one way of maintaining senior OSD-level supervision that could facilitate a fuller integration of MARS' contingency communications capabilities into the Department's C3 operations.
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Once upon a time my boss of the moment complained: "Stop bringing me problems. Bring me solutions." Good advice, and applicable here. Mr. Trachtenberg's latest posting on the April 2010 ASD(NII) meeting moves us in that very desirable direction, and so does Mr. Keane's. Let's push ahead with it. Mr. T. outlines an eye-catching array of parties with potential interest in managing MARS. That's got to be dealt with. For his part, Mr. D. plunges right into the core issue: "Which DoD office should hold oversight responsibilities and which office should have operational control." But there we encounter a couple of problems. (So much for the advice). First, the complicated redistribution of ASD AORs could very well take years of negotiation and even political contention (like the congressional ire at closing down the Joint Force Command. 1,500 jobs!). What if a catastrophic event occurred in the meantime? What if a MARS organization preoccupied with marking time failed to mount an effective response? It could destroy us. ("Great job, Mike!") Should MARS leadership bet the farm on the likelihood that such an event-a/k/a contingency, as in contingency support-won't happen at an inconvenient moment? Truth is, there are really big decisions to be implemented before MARS can be deemed catastrophe-ready. Unity of command, for one, both in DoD and in the field. Secondly, something terribly important is missing if the decision-making begins with sole focus on the DOD side of the equation. No one has disputed the assertion that 99 per cent of today's MARS mission is homeland security. Before we get to Mr. Kean's core question, there's got to be the determination who/what/where/how will be receiving DOD Component and Civil Authority radio communications support. MARS has battlefield experience, so to speak, on that question. Hold your breath: The customer array will consist of deployed multiple NG and AR units, state AG and ARNORTH DCOs; FEMA regional directorates and Incident Commanders; city, county and state EMAs; public safety entities at all levels; federal and state transportation, forestry, health, etc. departments; and a raft of NGOs.And probably all at the same time. In short, the actual MARS mission will be transacted not between USD(P) and, say ARNORTH, or between ASD(HS&ASA) and DHS/FEMA, or all of the above. It will involve dozens if not hundreds of direct transactions between elements in the field. Implementation will be instantaneous, off the wall, beyond oversight from above. If it's true that three years might be required to sort out the replacement of ASD(NII) and JFCOM functions, sheer self-defense calls for an interim band-aid solution. That is, taking measures which are within the immediate purview of the three Chiefs without review by Service Secretaries or ASDs. For leaders and members in the field, the question in a disaster is "who's in charge HERE (not in Washington). "Here," of course is wherever contingency support is needed and/or requested. On the ground. It is within the authority of the three MARS chiefs to merge their three emergency ops plans . They're certainly empowered to devise a formula for automatically establishing unity of command in any situation by advance arrangement-whether by rotation among the three services, or seniority, or greatest number of members on the ground. And there are members with military, disaster response, or professional qualifications to work up the necessary documentation . (Army MARS has had some recent experience in high-priority planning-by-e-mail with a daunting deadline based on the hurricane season. It can be done if the Chief demands it.) Does the energy exist within MARS to start building solutions from the bottom up while awaiting the cosmic decisions from top down? You know, like houses are built, starting with the foundation.
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Once upon a time my boss of the moment complained: "Stop bringing me problems. Bring me solutions." Good advice, and applicable here. Mr. Trachtenberg's latest posting on the April 2010 ASD(NII) meeting moves us in that very desirable direction, and so does Mr. Keane's. Let's push ahead with it. Mr. T. outlines an eye-catching array of parties with potential interest in managing MARS. That's got to be dealt with. For his part, Mr. D. plunges right into the core issue: "Which DoD office should hold oversight responsibilities and which office should have operational control." But there we encounter a couple of problems. (So much for the advice). First, the complicated redistribution of ASD AORs could very well take years of negotiation and even political contention (like the congressional ire at closing down the Joint Force Command. 1,500 jobs!). What if a catastrophic event occurred in the meantime? What if a MARS organization preoccupied with marking time failed to mount an effective response? It could destroy us. ("Great job, Mike!") Should MARS leadership bet the farm on the likelihood that such an event-a/k/a contingency, as in contingency support-won't happen at an inconvenient moment? Truth is, there are really big decisions to be implemented before MARS can be deemed catastrophe-ready. Unity of command, for one, both in DoD and in the field. Secondly, something terribly important is missing if the decision-making begins with sole focus on the DOD side of the equation. No one has disputed the assertion that 99 per cent of today's MARS mission is homeland security. Before we get to Mr. Kean's core question, there's got to be the determination who/what/where/how will be receiving DOD Component and Civil Authority radio communications support. MARS has adequate battlefield experience, so to speak, on that question. Hold your breath: The customer array will consist of deployed multiple NG and AR units, state AG and ARNORTH DCOs; FEMA regional directorates and Incident Commanders; city, county and state EMAs; public safety entities at all levels; federal and state transportation, forestry, health, etc. departments; and a raft of NGOs. In short, the actual MARS mission will be transacted not between USD(P) and, say ARNORTH, or between ASD(HS&ASA) and DHS/FEMA, or all of the above. It will involve dozens if not hundreds of direct transactions between elements in the field. Implementation will be instantaneous, off the wall, beyond oversight from above. If it's true that three years might be required to sort out the replacement of ASD(NII) and JFCOM functions, sheer reality calls for an interim band-aid solution. That is, taking measures which are within the immediate purview of the three Chiefs without review by Service Secretaries or ASDs. For leaders and members in the field, the question in a disaster is "who's in charge HERE (not in Washington). "Here," of course is wherever contingency support is needed and/or requested. On the ground. It is within the authority of the three MARS chiefs to merge their three emergency ops plans . They're certainly empowered to devise a formula for automatically establishing unity of command in any situation by advance arrangement-whether by rotation among the three services, or seniority, or greatest number of members on the ground. And there are members with military, disaster response, or professional qualifications to work up the necessary documentation . (Army MARS has had some recent experience in high-priority planning-by-e-mail with a daunting deadline based on the hurricane season. It can be done if the Chief demands it.) Does the energy exist within MARS to start building solutions from the bottom up while awaiting the cosmic decisions from top down? You know, like houses are built, starting with the foundation.
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I thought somebody would catch me up for not responding to Mr. Kean's second core question, "what MARS is not and what it can not do." Here's one member's opinion on that, but in the interest of keeping it short I'll venture what we CAN do. The list of CANNOTS would run too long. In this member's vision of MARS in action, the approach would bear some resemblance to the Special Operations guys: Individuals with a variety of skills, thoroughly trained in the overall mission and the rules of engagement, gathered from different branches, responding to an immediate need, organizing in the moment, providing whatever service is required by the circumstances. It could be establishing a WinLink node or refueling a generator. Filling out the staffing at an ARNORTH DCO deployment or shadowing an ANG commander with VHF communications to the FEMA EOC. This isn't theory, by the way. Case in point. After 9/11, responding hams from New England found their two-meter connectivity either wasn't needed or didn't work among skyscrapers. No problem. They were qualified on screwdrivers and soldering irons and helped install the telephone system at the huge ARC emergency HQ, a tremendously urgent need. Interesting challenge for MARS leadership and trainers. How do you prepare that kind of real-world response to catastrophe? (My apology for the inadvertent double-posting previous to this. Moderator please expunge it.)
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I greatly appreciate the comments of all of the posters who have taken the time to contribute to this discussion. Going forward I hope we will not to lose sight of the forest for the trees. Certainly operational control is different than oversight, and perhaps a topic for another discussion. The proximate issue is the impending OSD-level oversight vacuum and the potential implications resulting from the disestablishment of the primary DoD office tasked with providing policy guidance and direction to MARS. To use an admittedly flawed business analogy, the Board of Directors needs to be replaced. This is a different issue than whether to realign the business units to maximize resource utilization, integrate operations to improve efficiency, or relocate the company's production plants to reduce costs. Although these operational issues are certainly important, their implementation and ultimate effectiveness may be compromised without strong leadership and policy direction from the top. It is my hope that MARS' value as a DoD asset will continue to be recognized and reaffirmed by a supportive OSD leadership after NII is disestablished.

Let me start out by saying I totally agree with Mr. Tracktenberg's last post. High level DoD oversight, policy guidance and support is a sine qua non for MARS mission fulfillment. Responding to Mr Sexton's comment, he correctly states "The list of CANNOTS would run too long." Well, why should we even consider what MARS can't do? Here is my answer. Those of us associated with the program have a good understanding of the strengths and limitations of MARS. DoD personnel who are not familiar with MARS ordinarily don't have a clue. The same can be said for personnel in other Federal departments, State and local governments, and First Responders too. Additionally, most people born after 1960 have no concept of the use of "Radio" for message transmission. The have grown up with technology that offers instant everything! Sending emails across the country and around the world and getting immediate responses to these emails is just the way things are. How could it not be? Nots' are important to people being told about MARS so that they do not expect instant delivery and perfectly clear, static free radio links. DoD generates an awesome amount of message traffic. Emergency planners often compare their high volume, error free, instantaneous and secure digital and voice capabilities with the low volume, sometimes noisy, uncovered, capability of MARS and reject the program out of hand. My typical response is to ask that in the event of an emergency would it be better for them to have the ability to communicate their needs locally and nationally or would they rather have no capability at all." Usually the response is "Oh, I didn't think of that." But what of the future? Repeating what I wrote earlier, "High level DoD oversight, policy guidance and support is a sine qua non for MARS mission fulfillment." For the fact is, if you don't know where you're going, any road will take you there.

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