The Perception Trap: Why Mission Focus Determines Our Future Tools

We do not see objects for what they are, but for what they allow us to do—a psychological truth that will determine the tools and capabilities the Department of the Air Force pursues in the future. The department has recognized the need to adapt to rapidly emerging technological capabilities for some time, but there has been very little discussion on how to do so. The truth is that adaptability first requires perception. We need to see things for what they can do before we can adapt to their possibilities. And what we perceive depends entirely on our objectives. Confusing what we do with how we do it will lead to overlooking vital tools and obstacles that can impact our overall mission.

Anyone who has taken an MBA class in the last 15 years knows about Kodak’s failure to adapt to the digital age. Kodak was an incredibly inventive company that first developed the digital camera in the 1970s. However, Kodak became so focused on the incremental improvement of the film industry, which had taken the company so far, that it began to mistake those improvements for its overall mission. Kodak became the company that “built better cameras,” not the company that “preserved memories,” leading it to view the digital camera as a threat to its business rather than an emerging technology that would revolutionize the industry.

This isn’t just a business failure; it’s a perceptual one. Psychologist James J. Gibson is famous for arguing that perception is based on affordances—actionable properties in relation to a goal, not physical attributes. A stone is a missile if you’re fighting off a wolf, but it’s a hammer if you’re erecting a tent. If you’re instead looking for water, you probably won’t see the stone at all (unless it’s in the way). Our ability to perceive things as tools relevant to accomplishing a goal, as obstacles to be overcome in pursuit of a goal or even to see them at all is entirely dependent on the goal we are pursuing at the time.

For example, the internet went down at Sheppard Air Force Base during the middle of a busy pilot training flight window with inclement weather. The weather shop could not distribute its products as usual. If the weather tech at the time thought his mission was uploading the forecast on the website, he would say, “I can’t do my job until the internet is restored.” However, this forecaster knew his mission was to ensure pilots knew the forecast, and the weather forecast went out via text to the operations supervisors who disseminated it down, and operations continued. What he did not do was mistake his procedure (how he accomplishes the mission) for his mission (deliver accurate, timely forecasts to pilots).

So, when are we in danger of mistaking our methods for our mission? Like Kodak, a focus on incremental improvements in our methods yields tremendous results over time, but it comes with danger. Exclusively pursuing incremental improvements in existing methods risks inadvertently shifting our overall goal toward “building a better camera” rather than executing the mission and causes us to miss emerging technologies that can be used in innovative ways to solve the same problems. 

In the Air Force, rapid turnover across various positions can accelerate this goal-shifting process. How often has each one of us arrived in a new position and learned how to do that job without focusing first on why that job even exists? When we prioritize continuity over purpose during a change of station, we pass down the “how” as a sacred ritual, inadvertently burying the “why” under layers of standardized procedure. It only takes a few turnovers before the original mission of that job is lost in the process of accomplishing it. This is a trap that the Air Force and other large organizations constantly risk falling into.

A paradigm shift is a radical change in how a mission is accomplished. This is true whether you are in the picture business or the business of protecting and defending the Constitution. History is replete with examples of paradigm shifts that go unrecognized, and those most likely to miss them are always those at the top of the old methods. I believe that happens because those at the top (like Kodak) become so good at incrementally improving the old way of doing things that they lose sight of their original mission in favor of improving their processes. We can only perceive a paradigm shift if we are properly oriented.

In today’s rapid advancement in technology, there are many examples of potential paradigm shifts and radical new ways of conducting attacks that we need to prepare for. Ukraine’s innovative use of drones in Operation Spiderweb did immense damage to Russia’s strategic forces more than 1,000 miles away from the Ukrainian/Russian border, using Russia’s own 4G/LTE cell networks to communicate and execute the attack, enhanced by an artificial intelligence-driven autopilot capability, should communications fail. Russia knew Ukraine had drones. It knew Ukraine had cell phone technology. Yet Russia was still caught unaware because it viewed cell networks as civilian infrastructure and drones as tactical toys; it failed to perceive the affordance of a networked, long-range precision strike package. Ukraine saw the possibilities because it was focused on a goal that opened its perception to these affordances.

As the Department of the Air Force looks to revamp its acquisition process, I urge leaders to consider whether it is trying to improve its methods or its ability to accomplish the mission. To ensure the latter, it must get its perception right. Perception is the key to adaptability, and proper mission focus is the key to perception. Focusing on the right goal will unlock the possibilities emerging in this new world of advancement, whether it’s artificial intelligence, massive low-Earth-orbit constellations, drone swarm technology or some other new capability. Paradigm shifts are coming; there is no question about that. The only question is, will we see them?

Lt. Col. Michael “Cash” Marchand is an active-duty U.S. Air Force officer and B-52 command pilot. He is currently a Department of the Air Force (DAF) fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In coordination with several Department of Defense and Department of Energy institutions, his 2026 DAF Fellowship research focuses on nuclear command and control systems and policies and their ability to evolve and respond to emerging threats and capabilities.