Service Members and Veterans Face a New Cyber-Meets-Cognitive Battlefield

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According to a Veterans and Citizens Initiative survey, eight out of 10 Americans have high trust in U.S. veterans, making them susceptible to malicious actors as targets for adversaries who wish to influence American sentiment, values and actions. 

Consider for a moment: Whose off-the-cuff input on a rapidly evolving crisis, national security threat or proposed federal legislation would you be more receptive to—your civilian neighbor or a decorated veteran with more than three decades of global security expertise?

Due to their demonstrated capabilities, professional experiences and completion of some of our nation’s most rigorous and regulated training programs, most of us would deem the veteran’s voice more trustworthy in times of chaos and calamity. For that reason, in recent years, our adversaries have increasingly prioritized attempts to manipulate the cognitive domains of veterans in hopes of gaining a strategic entry point into dismantling foundational aspects of American society, order and culture. 

Suppose a veteran falls prey to adversarial manipulation and unknowingly shares this deception with their communities. In that case, our adversaries’ influence is far more likely to slip past our natural defenses and skepticism, radiating throughout our home front under the guise of our natural inclination to trust those with service backgrounds. The mouthpiece that our adversaries can access to detonate foreign influence stateside is critical in amplifying the payload. While American veterans may no longer be on the frontlines of the physical battlefield, it’s imperative they recognize their high-value target status regarding information warfare and take steps to defend and protect their cognitive spaces, communities of influence, and, ultimately, our nation. 

In today’s politically charged climate, the online threat to our service members, veterans and their families from foreign adversaries is elevated. Hostile countries such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea seek to exploit specific groups by preying on their status as trusted and revered members of society to propagate—wittingly or unwittingly—their state-sponsored agendas. The mechanisms these foreign adversaries use against this demographic are effective because they play on their sense of duty or leverage innocuous employment opportunities. 

Russia is regarded as an enduring online threat to veterans and service members due to the nation’s highly sophisticated and diverse techniques used in disinformation campaigns that seek to push Kremlin-backed narratives. Some of these techniques include:

• Russia’s efforts to push foreign propaganda on websites disguised to resemble legitimate American media outlets give additional credibility to their messages. According to The Washington Post, a unit within Russia’s military intelligence apparatus responsible for conducting sabotage, political interference and other operations targeting the West is using American veterans to sow discord and amplify sociopolitical divisions across the United States. Veterans engaging with these websites have been observed sharing disinformation about American presidential candidates and propagating misinformation about unlawful activities that the U.S. military and NATO are purportedly undertaking in Eastern Europe, per a Russian-backed U.S. press outlet.
• Attackers also create online personas and bots that mimic veterans to disseminate disinformation regarding veteran affairs or related media during key political campaigns on mainstream and alternative social media platforms.  
• Finally, Russia’s development of online recruiting ads that using propaganda and misinformation to play on veterans’ sense of duty and patriotism to recruit these individuals to work for Russian paramilitary units or intelligence services. 

China, however, uses diverse cyber tactics to target U.S. veterans and service members on various narratives ranging from flashpoint domestic topics in the United States to influencing key topics for Beijing, including their “One China” policy with Taiwan. 

A September 2023 letter from retired Air Force General Charles Q. Brown Jr. to U.S. airmen cites China’s attempt to recruit unwitting U.S. veterans and active service members (nearing separation or retirement) with military occupational specialties in the aviation and aerospace career fields to fill critical intelligence gaps for the People’s Liberation Army. These recruitment efforts appear innocuous and use language that mirrors legitimate job postings within the U.S. defense contracting industry.

China also uses fake online accounts that impersonate U.S. service members or civilians on mainstream social media outlets such as X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok to sow discord on numerous foreign and domestic flashpoint topics like the support for Ukraine and reproductive rights, according to a report by NPR. 

Additionally, news of China collecting personally identifying information on the U.S. government, service members and veterans via TikTok to influence them on Beijing’s priority issues like the “One China” policy, highlights another less alarming way China is targeting this demographic.

Iran also leverages its vast cyber capability to target service members (nearing separation or retirement) and veterans via fake employment opportunities. These online advertisements are posted on websites offering seemingly legitimate employment opportunities but are designed to deploy malicious software to the target’s devices when they attempt to register. 

Iranian cyber actors have also developed fake U.S. news websites promoting political discontent among U.S. veterans in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election.

North Korea, while not directly targeting our veterans, is also actively using offensive cyber methods to illegally acquire sensitive military documents from government officials or private defense companies that veterans currently work for, Reuters has reported.

These cyber attacks include the use of spear phishing, malicious tools and software exploits to target employees at organizations that could benefit North Korea’s military and nuclear weapons program.

The mechanisms our adversaries use to manipulate the minds of military service members and veterans heavily leverage social media. Our adversaries may create and distribute emotionally charged, disturbing narratives built on harmful aspects associated with the veteran experience, such as civilian disrespect of military service, questioning the ethics of their involvement in previous wars and conflicts, and sowing distrust and feelings of betrayal. These manipulative narratives can impact veterans’ views of themselves, the government and our nation. Additionally, studies show social media can negatively impact mental health for veterans and others, which can, in turn, result in negative outcomes such as limited access to support resources. 

The goal of adversary action on this new cyber-meets-cognitive battlefield is to recruit influence targets to distribute adversary messaging, influence civic operations stateside and lead the veteran toward negative life outcomes. Such adversary action can take place over popular social media platforms, such as Facebook and Instagram, or over lesser-known, foreign-owned apps, such as the ongoing engagement we see with cadets and midshipmen at service academies on Jodel, a “hyperlocal community.” Regardless of the battlefield, the mechanism of adversaries bombarding highly targeted, manipulative narratives to some of our nation’s most trusted individuals remains the same. Unfortunately, the effects of cognitive infiltration by our adversaries are not restricted to just that one individual; instead, their esteemed influence can result in a ripple effect of negative outcomes through the dissemination and recruitment of others.

To combat the spread of mis/disinformation throughout our military and veteran community, we outline below actionable ways members can safeguard themselves and their community against this persistent and growing online threat. 

The first step in defending against adversarial manipulation is awareness of its proliferation and mechanisms of entry. We’re all potentially susceptible and should take action to shore up our cognitive defenses. We’ve observed that adversaries are using seemingly legitimate press outlets to push disinformation on various topics. To limit the chances of falling for a foreign actor’s dis/misinformation, individuals can verify that these press outlets and their correspondents are legitimate. Users can utilize digital literacy skills before sharing news from potentially nefarious actors.

Additionally, service academy cadets and midshipmen, service members and veterans should continuously monitor verified press on how foreign adversaries use mainstream and alternative social media, as well as crowd-sourcing apps like TikTok and Jodel, to push disinformation on key domestic and foreign issues, which will aid in curbing the spread of future false narratives.

Trusted veteran-connected organizations, including government agencies and nonprofit organizations, should also address lapses in awareness regarding the destructive impacts of disinformation and adversarial manipulation. Partnering with the U.S. Department of Defense and key veteran-affiliated organizations to provide regular information sessions on how foreign adversaries are attempting to influence these communities and their families, especially leading up to and during key domestic events such as elections and natural disasters, will increase their awareness of foreign dis/misinformation. This type of digital literacy training can help communities defend their cognitive spaces. 

Including this same education to service members nearing terminal separation or retirement could lessen the risk that this demographic will fall prey to these elaborate dis/misinformation campaigns by our foreign adversaries. 

The technologies our adversaries use to disseminate disinformation may change with time; however, the mechanisms adversaries use to target our high-value military and veteran community remain the same. By coming together as a community—both online and offline—the military-connected population can gain collective strength and defenses against adversaries that wish to invade our most personal spaces and manipulate actions through this cognitive warfare. Taking a strong, community-based stand against disinformation and arming ourselves with digital literacy skills will support sustainable security initiatives while preserving personal freedoms and positive outcomes for individuals, organizations and even our nation.

Welton Chang was formerly vice president of digital intelligence solutions for AlertMedia, a provider of risk intelligence solutions. Earlier, Chang served for nearly a decade as an intelligence officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency and in the Army, including two operational tours in Iraq and a tour in South Korea. Chang received a Ph.D. and an M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania, an M.A. from Georgetown University, and a B.A. from Dartmouth College.

Hannah Becker is the vice president of Becker Digital, a veteran-owned consulting firm. She served as a fellow at Joint Special Operations University and has been a faculty member at Norwich University, Virginia Military Institute and Ottawa University. She is also a member of the AFCEA Cyber Committee, where she has conducted research on the societal effects of mis/disinformation, cybersecurity education and digital transformation initiatives across public and private sectors.

Mike Meehan is a research analyst with Pyrra Technologies (acquired by AlertMedia), focused on providing customers with in-depth analysis on emerging disinformation and threat-related intelligence from alternative social media platforms. Before joining Pyrra Technologies, he served as an investigative analyst with Amazon Web Services, where he was part of a team providing time-sensitive intelligence support and mitigation strategies. He previously served in the U.S. Army as an all-source analyst.