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President's Commentary: Think Tactically, Act Strategically

A key challenge to building a new tactical technology acquisition model is that it requires carefully identifying and prioritizing requirements, as well as staying engaged with the acquisition arm of government throughout the acquisition process. Carefully defining an operational requirement—not the end technical solution—allows industry to develop and provide the most effective solution. Industry has a strong economic impetus to provide the capability that the operating forces require.

By Lt. Gen. Robert M. Shea, USMC (Ret.)

The U.S. military, which has been deployed to defend the nation’s interests for the past 13 years, is facing a new round of cuts, restructuring, refitting and new technology acquisitions. Tactical information technologies, in particular, are on the cusp of upgrades. But the approaches that have worked in the past no longer will work, and the failure to adapt to change could be devastating for the force.

We must find a different model for equipping our fighting men and women with the latest tactical information technologies. The current acquisition system, along with the emergent speed of new technology developments, demands a change—now. If the current system does not change, the force will find itself living with technology that is generations old and will not serve the needs of those who need it most. Our traditional new-technology edge will be neutralized.

In addition to rapid changes in technology, the existing acquisition approaches often are unresponsive in addressing rapidly evolving tactical information technology needs. Clearly, the tedious and deliberate Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) model will not work in today’s world. That effort was hamstrung by mission creep and other unnecessary outside influences that affected the program over the years. As technology evolves, additional stress will be placed on the acquisition system to field new capabilities. Technology is moving too quickly to suit the ponderous pace of acquisition displayed in the JTRS program.

The commercial sector is advancing the state of the art in information technologies faster than the military can buy it. Many military units recognize the value of commercial information technology and are taking advantage of it. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps has experimented with using 4G LTE cellular technology with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Other units are continuing to incorporate commercial technologies, often implementing them at the tactical edge.

The U.S. Defense Department is moving to adopt commercial technology. As the military moves closer to commercial solutions, the cost of innovation drops because of economies of scale. That in turn will provide flexibility for continuing to field capabilities and features incrementally. Nonetheless, the department must take this step smartly.

First, the fielding of this new technology must be aligned with the war plans and the unit deployment schedules of the services. For example, units that will be the first out the door should be the first equipped with the newest technologies.

A key challenge to building a new tactical technology acquisition model is that it requires carefully identifying and prioritizing requirements, as well as staying engaged with the acquisition arm of government throughout the acquisition process. Carefully defining an operational requirement—not the end technical solution—allows industry to develop and provide the most effective solution. Industry has a strong economic impetus to provide the capability that the operating forces require.

Key characteristics must be identified and implemented into the solution. And, interoperability must be one of those key performance parameters. Information technology requirements among the services frequently are similar. Differences often are overstated and generally very minor. In many cases, common solutions can trump interoperable solutions.

Interoperability must be assigned a value in operational terms. Perhaps delivering an 80 percent interoperable solution on time is good enough from an operational perspective rather than targeting a 100 percent solution that never is achieved because of evolving technology and requirement changes.

Security is another issue in this new way of doing business. Security standards and certification are necessary and must be identified, developed and built in at the beginning of the development process. A tactical information device must be secure enough to protect its data and its communications. So, the National Security Agency (NSA) must partner closely with the services, other agencies and industry. The NSA’s role will be to provide timely and appropriate security standards and certification methods, along with the methodology, so the commercial sector can align its solution more closely to the warfighters’ need.

It makes little sense to spend years trying to develop and field a 100 percent solution when available technology and evolving needs are changing continuously. Rather, we should provide the “good enough” solution, with the appropriate security protections, that is adapted to the requirements of warfighters to meet their needs in a timely manner. Solutions also must allow for timely upgrades. And, implementing commercial off-the-shelf capabilities will provide a strong degree of familiarity among the users in the field.

Technology advancements are a driver for their own change. The solution that fits a 2016 requirement probably will not adequately fit a 2020 requirement. Consequently, an acquisition must have the flexibility and the adaptability to allow incorporation of the newest capabilities. The defense community cannot afford to let outdated acquisition models serve as a barrier. Nor can the user expect the 100 percent solution. If we don’t adapt to a new acquisition model, we will be left with what amounts to a collection of legacy equipment ill-suited to the warfighters’ needs.