This is a loaded question. I do not mean to suggest that we should take advantage of another's misfortune, even when it is the Department of Defense's. Real harm has been done by the Wikileaks perpetrators and the incident has certainly affected national security. Alliances and perhaps lives, may be at risk in real ways. However, my point in asking the question is this: the functionality offered by 'insider security monitoring' and role based cyber security has taken-on a new priority in the IC...and perhaps the entire federal government. And so it should. The implication is that in all federal agencies, big events (or screw-ups) typically precede big changes as well as big spending in certain categories.

U.S. military command and control (C2) systems developers are closer to enhanced interoperability after the release of C2 Core Version 1.0 in October. The core is an open, Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based data exchange standard developed by the C2 community for capability implementation. These data standards change the current approach to military-systems design that results in unique interfaces, often with multiple standards for similar data, for each information exchange.

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) researchers recently released a new and improved bug catching system designed to more efficiently find software glitches during the development process. The Advanced Combinatorial Testing System (ACTS) generates plans for efficiently testing every combination of six or fewer interacting variables rather than the more commonly used “pairwise” approach to testing software, which checks combinations of only two variables.

Much has been written about maneuver in various domains of conflict—land, sea and air. As in many other fields, the thinking owes much to the late Col. John Boyd, USAF, who is well known for his concept of the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act), and who contributed materially to thinking about maneuver warfare vice attrition warfare.

After 10 years of service, it is time to say goodbye to the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet—almost. The massive network serves more than 700,000 sailors, Marines and civilians and makes up about 70 percent of the total Navy information technology footprint ashore. It originally was supposed to finish its time with the Navy in early fall to make way for the Next Generation Enterprise Network. Instead, the sea service has extended the life of the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet and will spend $3.4 billion on a continuity-of-services contract to keep the network around for another 43 months.

It is the objective of the U.S. Navy’s Information Dominance Corps to manage a global network that delivers instant integration of military data across a number of separate specializations such as geographic, intelligence, logistics and manpower, as well as provide information about red or blue forces. The semantic Web will be the engine needed to power the effort.

The U.S. Navy is steaming full speed toward attaining its dream of a digital force, but the most difficult part of the journey may lie just ahead. The sea service has its technological map, and its course has the endorsement of the top leadership. However, it must deal with a new set of challenges as its info-centric force evolves into a new form.

Sailors assigned to the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Nimitz carrier strike groups had an uncommon training opportunity recently when they conducted a joint exercise in the waters near Southern California. Though carrier groups often operate together to respond to real-world events, disparate taskings and locations usually prevent combined rehearsals. But thanks to fortuitous schedules, the Lincoln and Nimitz assets were able to meet up in the vast Pacific, enabling personnel to combine resources in preparation for future mission requirements.

As conflict in Afghanistan intensifies, coalition allies are employing all elements of information-gathering technology to win battles while protecting themselves and civilians. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activity is at an all-time high as experts try to coordinate the largest armada of these capabilities ever deployed.

I spent some time last month in London at the AFCEA TechNet International event run by our AFCEA Europe office. This conference dealt with integrating the cyber domain into our concept of battlespace. It occurred to me during this discussion that our understanding of battlespace has changed fundamentally even before we add the cyber domain. Would we have considered the World Trade Center in New York part of the battlespace before 9/11? Would we have considered the London Underground part of the battlespace before 7/7? Probably not. In this age of asymmetric warfare, the boundaries of the physical battlespace are unclear. In this context, adding the cyber domain, which is broader than the Internet, is perhaps not as much of a stretch as it might have been prior to this redefinition of the physical battlespace.